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 ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis establishes a framework for analyzing Japanese pseudo-historical ludic media 
within the Japanese ideo-cultural context from a Cultural Studies perspective. It examines how 
discourses of war memory, gender, and politics inflect the texts of Onimusha (2001), Sengoku 
BASARA (2005), and Metal Gear Solid (1998). As artifacts of a demonized militarism and 
societal pacifism, these games justify ludic violence with player-avatars who have defensive 
masculinities. Through interactivity, however, this mechanism interrogates pacifism. In this 
questioning, these games take on transformative potential as cultural technologies. Onimusha 
and Sengoku BASARA seek to foreclose upon this potential through narrative denunciation and 
parody. Conversely, Metal Gear Solid leaves this potential open. As a game whose narrative 
supports a progressive political agenda, it unintentionally endorses an ultraconservative 
conception of both politics and history—thereby constituting a nationalistic argument. In sum, 
this research suggests that videogames are imbricated in processes of imagining Japanese 
nationhood.
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Introduction: The Wonder(ing) Years of Videogames 
The 1990s in Japan, the so-called “lost decade,” was a period characterized by a general 
sense of social malaise instigated by the breaking of the bubble economy.1 Years of 
unprecedented financial growth ground to a halt, giving way to two decades of recession. Japan 
also experienced the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995, and domestic terror in the form of the 
Aum Shinrikyō Sarin Gas attacks a few months later. Simultaneously, however, the decade also 
saw “[t]he growing popularity of Japanese anime, comic, and videogame products around the 
world.”2 Japanese videogame companies took advantage of the North American videogame crash 
in 1993 to increase their market share, such that, “[i]n 2002, it is estimated that Japan accounted 
for nearly 50% of the world's gaming market.”3 Even though this share has fallen steadily since 
the mid-2000s, Japan’s industry has maintained a yearly revenue of around $20 billion for the 
last decade. Surpassed only by the United States, Japan is a major producer of ludic medium 
within a worldwide trade that has, since the 1970s, grown into one of the world’s largest 
entertainment industries. 
So astounding has been the rise of videogames that Game Studies has grown as a 
discipline in its own right since the late 1990s. Still in its infancy, the field has tended towards a 
formalism that rarely takes a game’s country of origin into account, let alone the greater cultural 
moment of its production. Instead, studies that stress the hybrid nature of the industry’s growth 
abound—no doubt a bi-product of the coterminous emergence of Game Studies with theories of 
                                                
1 Tomiko Yoda and Harry D. Harootunian, "Introduction," in Japan after Japan: Social and 
Cultural Life from the Recessionary 1990s to the Present, ed. Tomiko Yoda and Harry D. 
Harootunian (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 11. 
2 This phenomenon is occasionally referred to in Japanese as the lost two decades (ushinawareta 
nijūnen). 
3 Marc Cieslak, "Is the Japanese Gaming Industry in Crisis?," BBC Click, Nov. 4 2010. 
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globalism.4 Nor are these claims baseless: flows of technology from the United States to Japan in 
the 1970s did indeed jumpstart the industry there.5 
However, this alone is not enough to dismiss the cultural facets of videogame production 
in Japan. How did the socio-political scene of the 1990s inform the growth of the Japanese 
industry in the same period? To simply overlook the local meanings of game texts, particularly 
within the environment of their production, undermines their potential research value as artifacts. 
It neglects an important set of tools that area studies can bring to the formal theorization of 
games. Moreover, failure to address games as artifacts risks imposing Euro-American 
(“universal”) regimes of knowledge upon the medium in a manner that teaches us little about 
Japan itself. 
This thesis, therefore, offers a framework that bridges the gap between Game Studies and 
Japanese Studies. I propose that games are shaped by the socio-political concerns of their 
developers’ everyday lives, and thereby accrue meaning within their “domestic” context. In other 
words, ludic media are cultural artifacts that become meaningful within their specific ideo-
cultural environments. I further argue that, within their contexts of production, games also take 
on a transformative potential. They are complex cultural technologies that can represent their 
constituent discourses in novel ways—and thereby offer certain messages through interweaving 
political and ideological subtexts. In other words, games are products of, and contributors to, the 
greater socio-cultural fabric of Japan. 
Naturally, this cloth contains any number of threads, and I do not propose to pull on them 
                                                
4 For example, see Mia Consalvo, "Convergence and Globalization in the Japanese Videogame 
Industry," Cinema Journal 48, no. 3 (2009); "Console Video Games and Global Corporations: 
Creating a Hybrid Culture," New Media & Society 8, no. 1 (2006). 
5 For example, see Martin Picard, "The Foundation of Geemu: A Brief History of Early Japanese 
Video Games," Game Studies 13, no. 2 (2014). 
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all. Rather, I am interested in several key discourses that bridge the 1990s and 2000s. At heart, 
each of these discourses is related to a heightened sense of wondering that was partially 
retrospective in its gaze. By wondering, I mean a space of opened perspectives and critical 
thought, yet lacking in any definitive conclusions or consensus. As Harry Harootunian argues: 
[T]he present [1990s] has provided a space for a convergence of political and economic 
insolvency and a greater consciousness of memory and history, however contingent, and 
thus the figure of a consequential conjuncture in which the political and economic 
failures of the 1990s have overdetermined the need to explain the present by resorting to 
memory and history as a way of alerting Japanese to repressed possibilities that must now 
be resuscitated if the future is to look different from the present.6 
 
This reevaluation considered Japan’s “Long Postwar,” the economic and social status quo that 
extended from defeat up until the early 90s. Rather than considerations of “the war itself, or 
indeed the vast complex history before the war,” Japan’s self-image rested upon “the memory of 
living through the postwar, [and] the nation in defeat... [which] was coupled with the idea of 
culture to construct an endless present.”7 In other words, Japan was so caught up in overcoming 
defeat that a broad societal reflection on the conflict itself fell by the wayside. This moment of 
triumphant progress, then, led to the dominant nationhood of postwar period. 
The retrospective wondering of the 1990s, in reconsidering the status quo, looked 
particularly to war memory, gender, and political identities. Indeed, this was a period marked by 
many pundits, such as the infamous Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai, calling for 
revisionist histories. At their most nationalistic, these groups downplayed or outright ignored 
wartime atrocities; at their most progressive, they reviewed Japanese responsibility and memory 
with a critical eye. In the background, “other” masculinities came to prominence during the 
                                                
6 Harry D. Harootunian, "Japan's Long Postwar: The Trick of Memory and the Ruse of History," 
in Japan after Japan: Social and Cultural Life from the Recessionary 1990s to the Present, ed. 
Tomiko Yoda and Harry D. Harootunian (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 107. 
7 Ibid., p. 98-101. 
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1990s: the otaku consumer, “a geeky, obsessive, socially inept, technologically fluent nerd,” took 
his place as “the polar opposite of the image of the gregarious, socializing breadwinner, the 
salaryman”—theretofore the hegemonic form of masculinity in Japan.8 This development was 
partially predicated upon popular forms of culture, of which videogames were undoubtedly one. 
Lastly, the 1990s saw a significant reconfiguration of the political left and right, and an attendant 
rethinking of the U.S.-Japan relationship.9 In short, this was a period wherein war memory, 
gender, and political identities were in a state of flux. 
This thesis is devoted to considering how videogames grew within this environment. As 
artifacts, how did they navigate these fraught topics? As technologies, how did they contribute to 
these greater discourses? In answering, I hope to show that games have attempted to eschew 
overt commentary on societal matters, yet have unintentionally added surprising perspectives to 
the greater mix. 
Aims and Method 
 Practically speaking, my aims are twofold. First, I seek to incorporate the particular 
concerns of Japanese socio-political discourses in a methodology for reading ludic media in 
context. Second, I apply this methodology by analyzing three specific examples of games 
produced between 1998 and 2005. I have no aspirations to be comprehensive in this endeavor. 
Rather, I choose three texts that I believe to be representative of what I term the “pseudo-
historical” genre. This is a category of my own devising. I use it to broadly indicate games that 
are rooted within the historical imaginary; that is, games that draw their settings from the real 
                                                
8 Ian Condry, "Love Revolution: Anime, Masculinity, and the Future," in Recreating Japanese 
Men, ed. Sabine Frühstück and Anne Walthall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 
p. 263. 
9 Yoda and Harootunian, “Introduction,” p. 4. 
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past. In this sense, certain forms of science fiction meet this criterion insofar as they root their 
predictions in “true” history. The “pseudo” denotes that these works are not serious attempts to 
analyze either the past or present. Thus, they are not intentionally engaged with the societal 
forces that Harootunian indicates. Put another way, this study considers the re-presentation of 
history as focused through a lens of historical memory. In both cases, the truth claims of these 
products to the historical facts is minimal, often purposely so. Rather, I see these games in 
dialogue with a basically ahistorical cultural memory and imaginary. 
I consider the complex relationship these cultural discourses and game-texts from a 
Cultural Studies perspective; that is, weighing the texts against greater societal discourses. It is in 
this light that I label these products as artifacts: each game is less an intentional argument than a 
reflection of a fragmented landscape. Retrospective wondering, or its legacy in later games, 
shapes these texts at a much deeper level: the representation of their content ultimately refracts 
not only contemporary concerns, but is also molded by discussions of war memory, gender, and 
political identity. This point is most visible in developers’ design choices. Due to interactivity—
the particular characteristic of the medium—certain ideologies of the Long Postwar constrain 
ludic production. However, in the games that I analyze, these constrictions and omissions 
themselves manifest in ways that may be read as commentary upon our key ideologies. My goal 
moving forward, then, is to situate three pseudo-historical games amongst greater discourses, and 
to explore their particular textual form and message as it may influence the player. 
With this understanding, I analyze Onimusha (2001), Sengoku BASARA (2005), and 
Metal Gear Solid (1998). The first two take place during a fictionalized version of the Sengoku 
period (1467-1603), with various samurai—real and fabricated—as protagonists. The last, 
conversely, features a contemporary geopolitical plot that requires an American agent to stop 
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rogue U.S. military forces. 
 Although these products evidently differ in content, they have a number of common 
points. They are all, for instance, single-player games; that is, designed to be played individually 
and offline.10 They are also action games, in a broad sense. In other words, they each have the 
player taking control of an avatar in three-dimensional space. Gameplay—the actions of the 
player avatar in simulated space—involves combat to greater or lesser degrees in all three. Each 
game was also released on the Sony PlayStation platform. Generally, Sony’s products have been 
the highest-selling home gaming consoles in Japan, and the company has come to cast a long 
shadow over both domestic and international markets in terms of hardware.11 Moreover, the 
PlayStation has generally held a more adult image (whether this be defined in terms of a game’s 
thematic, violent, or sexual content) than Nintendo’s immensely popular handheld consoles. All 
three games fit this image, within a limit: under the Japanese Computer Entertainment Rating 
Organization (CERO), Onimusha and Metal Gear are both rated “C’ (15 years or older), while 
BASARA is rated “B” (12 years or older).12 The popularity of my case studies, then, owes 
something to the ubiquity of the PlayStation platform, as well as their relatively accessible 
ratings. For reasons that I will enumerate presently, these games are also broadly designed with a 
male audience in mind. 
                                                
10 I make this point to distinguish the games I analyze from “Massively multiplayer online role-
playing games” (MMORPGs), of which there have been several studies. For more on this genre, 
see T. L. Taylor, Play between Worlds: Exploring Online Game Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2006). and Dean Chan, "Locating Play," in Asian Popular Culture: New, Hybrid, and 
Alternate Media, ed. John A. Lent and Lorna Fitzsimmons (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 
2013). 
11 The PlayStation 1 (1994) sold over 19 million units in Japan alone, while the PlayStation 2 
(2000) managed to hit 23 million. 
12 The CERO system itself features one category below these (“A:” Appropriate for all), and two 
above: “D” (17 years and older) and “Z” (18 years and older). Interestingly, a perusal of “Z” 
games brings up many American games, but very few Japanese ones. 
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Relatedly, each game garnered particular success within Japan either critically or 
commercially, and all have subsequently been serialized. The works I analyze are remarkable 
insofar as they are the first products in what have since become sprawling intellectual properties 
(IPs). Onimusha, for instance, sold 1.04 million copies in Japan alone, and grew as a franchise 
over the course of a decade to include three AAA titles (the gaming equivalent of the Hollywood 
blockbuster) and several secondary products (B or C movies). Sengoku BASARA (2005) boasted 
less impressive sales initially, but nevertheless has become a gargantuan transmedia IP that 
includes four main titles, any number of secondary ones, and a fairly popular anime series. Both 
Onimusha and BASARA were produced by Capcom, one of Japan’s largest videogame producers. 
Metal Gear Solid, conversely, is a highly-profitable IP belonging to Konami Digital 
Entertainment. Selling between 780,000 and 1 million copies in Japan, it is by far the most 
critically-acclaimed of the three games, with awards from Bunkachō Media Arts and the 
Entertainment Supplier’s Association.13 As an IP, it now contains five AAA titles and several 
fairly well-received spinoffs. 
Each of these games, moreover, has a significant international following. Doubtlessly, 
this had an influence upon the developmental process as well. Nonetheless, my concern with this 
thesis is to examine these games within Japan itself. As such, I focus on how these games mean 
within the intertext of Japanese ideo-culture; that is, the discourses which interpenetrate 
everyday life within a certain geographical space. This choice is informed by my personal 
experiences working within the Japanese videogame industry for two years. As an in-house 
localizer at one of the most prestigious companies in Japan, I was responsible for the North 
American release and ongoing production of content for several mobile and one AAA game. 
                                                
13Anonymous, "'Taitanikku' genshō (Kiiwādo de kurikaeru geinō 98 nen)," Aera 1998.  
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During my tenure there, I was struck by the insularity to developmental practices within the 
company. Indeed, it was as if the existence of a localization department freed the developers 
from many concerns of how global audiences—which were highly profitable—would receive 
their games.14 Naturally, producers and directors were hardly blind to international markets, but 
there was a much stronger inward orientation to their gaze than an outward one. This seemingly 
held true for what market trends and design benchmarks they watched, and extended even to 
some of their design choices. For instance, in a game which was set in a Western fantasy world, 
the characters would nevertheless bow in a socially, even professionally, normative fashion in 
Japan. This may seem a small point, but it suggests a host of small, unanalyzed assumptions that 
informed the game-text that interlaced a game supposedly free from any elements of Japanese 
culture. 
My professional experiences lead me to situate my study within the Japanese domestic 
context precisely so that I may consider what underlies this host of small assumptions. While I 
acknowledge that certain textual elements and developmental practices are indeed hybrid, I 
contend that the meanings of these games arise against a “Japanese” background. In this, I am 
implicitly assuming that games mean intertextually; therefore, the geographically-located 
discourses against which ludic media can become meaningful should not escape the gaze of the 
game researchers. This is neither to ascribe some ineffable authenticity to these products within 
their domestic contexts, nor to deny that some of the meanings I find in my analysis do transfer 
to other ideo-cultural or national contexts. For the purposes of the present study, however, I limit 
myself to considering the relationship between Japanese ideo-culture, games, and Japanese 
                                                
14 Interestingly, I felt that there was certain underlying ideology to this stance whereby cultural 
difference could be assuaged largely by linguistic means—that is, translation. 
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players. 
I similarly limit the scope of my study to the strictly textual. My goal is to demonstrate a 
means of conceptualizing ludic media on the theoretical level. As such, several of my claims, 
particularly related to games-as-technologies, merit further empirical investigation than I have 
been able to provide. In this regard, I imagine my work as a pilot study, one half of a longer 
research project that involves in-depth ethnographical investigations into the reception of these 
products amongst Japanese players. 
With this understanding, I now turn to a brief examination of the current literature. While 
Onimusha, Sengoku BASARA, and Metal Gear Solid are particularly popular pseudo-historical 
games, they are not alone in terms of popular media that borrow from the past. Indeed, the use of 
history in popular texts and media is a phenomenon of which Japanese Studies has taken heed. In 
positioning pseudo-historical games, then, a comparison with other historical media is 
instructive. 
The Past as an Ideo-Historical Playground 
Perhaps most famously, Carol Gluck has argued that manipulations of history—as well as 
interpretations thereof—can impart certain values to perceptions of the present. Particularly, she 
argues that the (re)imaginations of the Edo period (1603-1868) have been key in constructing 
ideo-historical narratives in Japan. By means of othering the real past, positively or negatively, 
Gluck shows how contemporary thinkers have variously redefined the meaning of “Japan.” Thus, 
Edo has acted as “the mirror of modernity” through a fluid series of “un-pre-proto-post modern” 
identities.15 
                                                
15 Carol Gluck, "The Invention of Edo," in Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern 
Japan, ed. Stephen Vlastos (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 262, 283. 
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Within interactive texts, can this selfsame use of the past occur? In other words, what 
happens when players are allowed to willfully manipulate history? From a historical perspective, 
Andrew B.R. Elliott and Matthew Kapell have suggested that, rather than acting as mere 
pedagogical tool for teaching historical fact, a videogame’s power lies more in its ability to re-
present history; that is, to (re)narrate the past. The design of a game allows not only for an 
immersion in history, but also for facilitating player understanding of the “complex discourse of 
contingency, conditions, and circumstances, which underpins a genuine understanding of 
history.”16 In “doing” even vaguely realistic simulations of history, the player is reminded that 
the past was dynamic, and may come to reconsider the idea of the history as inevitable. 
 In the Japanese context, several studies have posited that historical fiction serves a similar 
function as a means of commenting upon and critiquing the contemporary. Hori Hikari notes 
how fictionalized versions of the past may comment upon the present to denaturalize it. She 
looks specifically to the works of Yoshinaga Fumi (Ōoku) and Yoshiya Nobuko (Tokugawa no 
fujintachi), both of whom deal with the Tokugawa Shogunate’s inner chambers. She argues that 
the reversal of gender roles in the texts, which place women as the key figures in the past, seeks 
to denaturalize the masculinization of history. However, whereas Yoshiya tries to “offer a 
counter-narrative against the male-dominated existing narrative mode of popular literature,” 
Yoshinaga instead decries the violence inherent in heterosexual power relations.17 Here, the 
authors’ willful manipulation of history foregrounds and questions a present arising from such 
                                                
16 Andrew B. R. Elliott and Matthew Kapell, "Introduction: To Build a Past That Will "Stand the 
Test of Time--Discovering Historical Facts, Assembling Historical Narratives," in Playing with 
the Past: Digital Games and the Simulation of History, ed. Andrew B. R. Elliott and Matthew 
Kapell (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 13. 
17 Hikari Hori, "Views from Elsewhere: Female Shoguns in Yoshinaga Fumi's Ōoku and Their 
Precursors in Japanese Popular Culture," Japanese Studies 32, no. 1 (2012), p. 84. 
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rhetoric: namely, one characterized by ryōsai kenbo (“good wife, wise mother”) that implicitly 
created a gendered division of labor in the service of national progress. 
An analogous line of thought is evident in Rosa Lee’s analysis of anime and manga that 
deal with the shinsengumi—the pro-Shogun units dispatched to stop marauding pro-Emperor 
forces towards the end of the Edo Period. She is interested in the shinsengumi specifically as 
Shiba Ryōtarō’s Moeyo ken (serialized 1962-1964) and the manga Gintama (serialized 2004-
present) represent them. Whereas fans were drawn to the earlier work as a means of mitigating 
the pressures of Japanese communitarianism in the midst of breakneck economic development, 
later fans appreciated Gintama in the 2000s because “people’s efforts to find their individuality 
[are] being hindered by social and cultural constraints.”18 The past here is a mirror, one that 
reflects contemporary ideals onto times long past so as to consciously comment upon the now. 
The primary difference between these various uses of history and the pseudo-historical 
genre of games is largely one of intent. Historical games—and I include even works of historical 
fiction in this category—seem to find use as vehicles for comment upon the contemporary or to 
question the inevitability of history. While the pseudo-historical works that I examine may serve 
similar functions, I believe it is ultimately unintentional. Onimusha, BASARA, and Metal Gear 
are not about history as such; they do not attempt to create teleological narratives that result, for 
better or worse, in the present. Their fiction itself is not an intentional comment upon the present, 
and their divergences from reality serve an altogether different purpose that I will explore in 
greater detail as this study unfolds. For the moment, however, let us simply note that the past in 
my case studies is a space for play. These games use history (and, to a lesser extent, the future) 
as a platform for ludic activity. 
                                                
18 Rosa Lee, "Romanticising Shinsengumi in Contemporary Japan," New Voices 4 (2011), p. 184. 
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Perhaps the closest use of pseudo-history can be found within Hasegawa Kazumi’s 
chapter on otome games, a genre designed for female consumers. She argues that these works 
allow players to join in the “‘queering of history,’ [and] challenging the constrained discourse of 
difference and identity” when featuring the shinsengumi.19 Echoing Lee, she notes that this group 
have been a site of pop cultural fascination as “their stories illustrate the prototypical legends of 
Japanese tragic heroes;” that is, those espousing the pre-modern values of samurai loyalty.20 
Such values are encoded with heteronormative masculinity—and thereby designed for the 
consumption by heterosexual female players. Nevertheless, female fan communities often 
cosplay as men, the female objects of desire, through cross-dressing, thus subverting the gender 
roles of the patriarchy. The power of such games lies in their capacity to imagine history through 
play—both on and off the screen. This, in turn, allows players to reconsider their own identities 
as female. Though the game itself is gendered female, players rewrite historical narratives by 
immersing themselves in the past and transgressing their own implied role as heterosexual 
women. In this regard, these games do have an unintended effect on the subjectivity of their 
players through an ultimately fictional account of the past. As Hyeshin Kim argues, “[w]omen’s 
games are significant not simply because their existence potentially empowers the player with 
the understanding that she can be the normative, dominant audience, but also because she can 
experiment with and enact various female identities and female fantasies through the medium of 
electronic games.”21 Thus, these otome games act as cultural technologies. 
 The obvious difference between otome games and the pseudo-historical games that I 
                                                
19 Kazumi Hasegawa, "Falling in Love with History: Japanese Girls Otome Sexuality and 
Queering Historical Imagination," in Playing with the Past, p. 136. 
20 Ibid., p. 143. 
21 Hyeshin Kim, "Women's Games in Japan: Gendered Identity and Narrative Construction," 
Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 2-3 (2009), p. 20. 
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examine is largely one of gendered narrative: the former is feminized, and the latter broadly 
masculinized. One point of further interest in the games I examine, then, is the implication of a 
male audience. How Onimusha, BASARA, and Metal Gear construct masculinity, as we shall see, 
is often tied to gendered violence. How, then, do games contend with the memories of violent 
men—or, more pointedly, violent soldiers? Ultimately, the specific strategies of all three games 
imbricate war memory, gender, and political positions. 
Chapter Outline 
This thesis is divided into three chapters, each of which broadly explores the interstices 
of war memory, gender, and political positions. Chapter 1 provides the backbone for both formal 
analyses of ludic media, and specific facets of games within the Japanese context. Of particular 
interest are the key strategies that ludic media have evolved for dealing with violence against a 
cultural backdrop of political pacifisms. I explore how games turn away from historical 
simulations of war to instead embrace fictional settings, and how they use narrative positioning 
of the avatar to juxtapose the Japanese player with themes of militarism. This, in turn, allows for 
the logical possibility of non-militaristic violence. 
 Chapter 2 points to the centrality of gender in these works. I broadly consider how 
morality and masculinity work in tandem to allow for the possibility of justified violence. 
Through readings of Onimusha and Sengoku BASARA, I note how games have followed the 
example set by 1990s Japanese war films. From this precedent, both games construct 
masculinities defined by their ability to protect, which inscribes a moral imperative to use certain 
forms of violence. However, these masculinities cannot quite outrun the shadow cast by the 
Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). An ambiguity, therefore, lies at the heart of this construct that 
both Onimusha and BASARA take into account in two separate ways. 
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 Chapter 3 explores Metal Gear Solid through considering how the fragmented landscapes 
of war memory and political identity give meaning to the game’s structure. As a work that deals 
directly with (American) militarism, the game aligns itself with post-war pacifism. However, it 
ultimately undercuts this message in terms of both narrative and play. Though it attempts to 
condemn a demonized caricature of the IJA, it oscillates between progressive and centrist views 
of history, and opens a hole into which flows an (ultra)nationalist understanding of the past. This 
last message is encoded into the player’s actions in such a way as to question the legitimacy of 
moral pacifism. I finally argue that, more than the other games, Metal Gear contains a 
transformative potential to (re)inform the player’s political subjectivity.
 16 
Chapter 1: The Elements of the Pseudo-Historical Genre 
If games are to function both as artifacts and as technologies, they must somehow act as 
circuits both drawing from, and contributing to, greater social currents. Thus, I begin by 
commenting upon this process in two basic ways. I start with the formal characteristics of 
videogames that imbue them with the capacity for transformation. I subsequently comment upon 
the greater social discourses of war memory that contour the game text of pseudo-historical 
works, and in so doing lend meaning to the player’s actions. 
After discussing the basic three-part structure of games, I contend that a game’s narrative 
and play ultimately contain transformative potential insofar as they provide an opportunity for 
player reflection. In other words, it is a socialized subject who apprehends a game’s textual 
messages, and connects it again with external discourses. Though the game itself may provide 
the spark, then, it is ultimately the player herself who acts as a conduit. 
With this understanding, I turn to considerations of the social role of violence within 
pseudo-historical action games. I open with differences within American and Japanese memories 
of the Pacific War that explain why the United States has produced so many simulations of the 
conflict, and why Japan has produced so few (and none of any real stature). In short, the pseudo-
historical genre must contend with a socio-cultural background of pacifism that stems in large 
part from war memories that highlight the civilian experience while demonizing the military. 
Simulative games featuring realistic soldiery—and certain types of militaristic violence—take a 
political stance that distances them from more widely-accepted narratives of the war. Instead, 
pseudo-historical games turn to what I term fictional displacement, a strategy of giving games at 
least partially fantastic settings that divorce the Japanese player from any real memories of the 
Pacific War. In this sense, war memory acts as a deep structure lending shape to the distinct 
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manifestations of certain tropes in ludic media. 
 Even under fictional displacement, however, intertextual references connecting the 
player’s actions to militaristic violence are problematic. Thus, games often use their fantastic 
setting to oppose the player with emblems of militarism. This renders any violence he or she uses 
defensive, rather than aggressive. I subsequently offer a typology of videogame violence, 
arguing for a tripartite model that examines the actual content of the violence; the diegetic frame, 
that is, how it is construed within the game story; and finally, the cultural context, or how violent 
acts take on meaning within the confines of a given culture. After defining militaristic violence 
in this view, I argue that it serves to continue the general societal demonization of the Imperial 
Japanese Army (IJA). However, I note that there is an inherent ambiguity in pairing the player 
with violence of any kind, particularly within the pseudo-historical genre that has more obvious 
ties to history imaginaries. Amongst other elements, this ambiguity allows players to reflect upon 
the actions and position of their avatar in the game. 
Games as Games: Procedural Rhetoric and Player-Subjectivity 
 To begin, we must discern the formal properties of videogames as a medium. We may 
postulate a three-part structure broadly shared by all videogames with a certain degree of 
narrative sophistication.1 First, there is the storyworld, the general setting in which a videogame 
occurs. Second, there is the diegetic frame for the player avatar’s actions: what rules of the 
                                                
1 In general, Japanese videogames from the 1990s onwards have generally been a narrativized 
form, if not a narrative one in the strictest sense of the term. Thus, although I am aware of the so-
called ludology-narratology debate, I believe that the story of certain games is critical in the 
analysis thereof. For more in this vein, see Dennis Washburn, "Imagined History, Fading 
Memory: Mastering Narrative in Final Fantasy X," Mechademia 4, no. 1 (2009), Marie-Laure 
Ryan, Avatars of Story (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006) and Marie-Laure and 
Jan-Noel Thon Ryan, eds., "Storyworlds across Media: Toward a Media-Conscious 
Narratology," Style 49, no. 4 (2015). 
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storyworld contextualize his or her behavior? This may be defined either through narrative 
constraints, or through the rules of play. Finally, there is gameplay itself—the actions of the 
player within digital space. 
In each of these three categories, games communicate with the player at two levels: via 
the narrative (storyworld and diegetic frame), and via what Ian Bogost has termed “procedural 
rhetoric.”2 Bogost’s theory ascribes meaning to the structure of gameplay as defined and policed 
by the game rules.3 In other words, videogames contain a certain underlying message regarding 
what players can do and why the game asks them to do it. Herein lies the rhetorical power of 
rules: a perlocutionary act (a direct request) can take the guise of an illocutionary one (a 
statement with an implied request). 
If we may interpret procedural meaning through this framework, how do we relate 
gameplay to a game’s narrative? Espen Aarseth offers a simple but powerful model: a game’s 
plot is borne by “kernels,” or essential pieces of the story that the player cannot change. Linking 
these together are “satellites,” connective sections that allow for interactivity.4 Structured 
through the rules of play, satellites are home to procedural rhetoric. A linear game—with a set 
story and a predetermined order to player actions—will be composed of alternating kernels and 
satellites. The former establishes why the avatar is in a given situation, and the latter allows the 
player to act. 
 Though these frameworks describe the textual properties of videogames well, they treat 
                                                
2 Ian Bogost, Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2007), pp. 74-75, 99-101. 
3 Throughout this paper, I use “player” to describe videogame consumers as both spectator and 
agent. 
4 Espen Aarseth, "A Narrative Theory of Games," in FDG '12, ed. Magy Seif El-nasr, Mia 
Consalvo, and Steven Feiner (2012), p. 131. 
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the player as a passive, unthinking recipient of the game’s message. Miguel Sicart’s work, which 
establishes the player as an ethical actor, is enlightening in this regard. He argues that “[g]ames 
can have ethical affordances because they are designed and experienced by moral agents.”5 The 
potential for morality lies in what the rules of play allow, and what the rules of simulation—the 
logic of the storyworld—demand. Rules of play may give players opportunities to make ethical 
choices, while the rules of simulation may impose a moral regime upon them. In either case, the 
player can vicariously experience situations foreign to their everyday lives, and reflect on the 
morality of their avatar’s acts. 
 Sicart sees this potential for reflection as inherent, given that games are Foucauldian 
power structures. He argues that games exert an influence over the player through the rules of 
play and simulation, and thereby create a player-subjectivity. Bonded to the power structure, this 
subject exists to play: “A game operates as an event that creates a subject, a subject that needs to 
be faithful to the event’s constitution to come into being.”6 The player-subjectivity, however, 
does not exist in isolation from the myriad other subjectivities that compose a person. Sicart 
refers here to the “body-subject” that “takes place in the world of experiences, both passively and 
actively.”7 Just as the player-subjectivity may emerge in contexts other than the game, so too 
may the body-subject intrude on the gaming experience. The player is a moral agent precisely 
because of this two-layered identity: the body-subject, through lived experience, evaluates and 
reflects upon the actions of the player-subjectivity within the game. The fundamental mechanism 
for moral agency is “ludic phronesis,” or a pause in the flow of play wherein the body-subject 
                                                
5 Miguel Sicart, The Ethics of Computer Games (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009), p. 41; 
emphasis mine. 
6 Ibid., p. 71. 
7 Ibid., p. 78. 
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can evaluate the best choice among multiple options, or reflect on the ethicality of an imposed 
regime.8 
 Though Sicart’s focus is on matters moral, he also notes that “understanding the player-
subject as a skin [of the body-subject] is a useful metaphor because it connects the internal, 
individual subjectivity of the player with the larger communitarian, cultural, and historical 
subjectivities of the contemporary self.”9 In other words, the body-subject exists in part due to 
historical narratives, which inform a person’s sense of identity. Through the player-subjectivity, 
the body-subject may explore differing versions of both culture and history. Having tasted of 
these “other” experiences, the body-subject must make sense of them, a process that involves 
reconsidering certain societal discourses. While any media can arguably make this claim, 
videogames alone require the player-subject to experience others’ conceptions of these 
discourses. Here, then, lies the potential for games to connect disparate discourses within the 
thinking body-subject. 
 It is important to note that ludic phronesis is not simply structured by what the player 
does. Rather, the diegetic frame and storyworld each work to contextualize the gameplay in ways 
that ultimately influence the meaning of the player-subjectivity’s acts. Thus, all of these factors 
merit consideration when asking how the game influences the player, or how any game’s formal 
elements shape ludic phronesis. 
 All of this ultimately rests upon the greater culture within which a game text functions. I 
define “culture” here as a dynamic site of numerous discourses coalescing and clashing. No 
given ideology is necessarily unique to a national context; rather, I tend to think that such things 
                                                
8 Miguel Sicart, "Moral Dilemmas in Computer Games," Design Issues 29, no. 3 (2013), p. 31. 
9 Sicart, The Ethics of Computer Games, p. 79; emphasis mine. 
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drift unseen between geographic borders. Nevertheless, a specific configuration of ideologies 
may be distinct to a given territorial unit. Thus, the meanings derived through play—that is, 
through narrative conceits and ludic phronesis—function in a certain fashion within the national 
context of their production. Put another way, we must consider not only the constituent 
discourses within a game, but also the greater ideologies external to it in order to perform ideo-
cultural readings. This point draws us to war memory as the operative discourse which lends 
meanings to player’s violent play within action games. 
Remediation: Narratives of the Victor and the Vanquished 
 In considering the relationship between cultural memory in general and ludic media, 
numerous scholars have turned to the concept of remediation.10 This theory describes how media 
have been “commenting on, reproducing, and replacing each other... Media need each other in 
order to function as media at all.”11 As Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney note, cultural memory also 
depends upon a media for mass transmission, and the media themselves rely upon previous 
iterations.12 The content of each text is in this sense “premediated” by other such texts.13 
Premediation re-contextualizes past memories so that they may create schemata for future 
events, setting up a thematic chain where none may otherwise exist. Memory thus becomes “a 
                                                
10 Alison Landsberg’s work on prosthetic memories has also been used to describe the 
relationship of cultural memory and videogames. For an example, see Laquana and Gaines S. 
Hubbell Cooke, "Working out Memory with a Medal of Honor Complex," Game Studies 15, no. 
2 (2015). 
11 J. David and Richard A. Grusin Bolter, Remediation: Understanding New Media (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), p. 55. 
12 Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, "Introduction: Cultural Memory and Its Dynamics," in Mediation, 
Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory, ed. Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney (New 
York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), p. 1-7. 
13 Debra Ramsay, American Media and the Memory of World War II (Taylor and Francis, 2015), 
p. 24. 
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procedural and transmedial phenomenon.”14 The dynamics affecting any given media product 
may be drawn from a rich tapestry of cultural myths, values, and relevant fiction.15 
 It is within this framework that we may understand the above disparity between 
American and Japanese ludic media set during WWII. This difference lies in war narratives: 
America was the victor, Japan the vanquished.16 U.S. media depictions of the conflict tend to 
portray it as a “good war” fought by GIs. As such, “the war memories of civilians and the 
experiences of soldiers and resistance fighters outside the US do not feature prominently” in 
media depictions of the war.17 This basic structure lends itself easily to the videogame format. 
Protagonists and antagonists may be cleanly shown as either Axis- or Allied-powers, the 
morality of the conflict validates the use of violence, and civilian casualties and suffering can be 
safely omitted. Perhaps the most representative model of this is Medal of Honor (1999)—a 
brainchild of Steven Spielberg following the success of Saving Private Ryan—which opened a 
decade of increasingly realistic first-person shooter (FPS) games featuring Americans battling 
Nazis.18 Although this genre has at times questioned aspects of the American narrative, its 
greatest contribution has been to remind players that combat can be fun—a point missing from 
most other depictions of war.19 These games present the battlefield as a playground of sorts, a 
platform to restore the sense of exhilaration in combat without troubling players with questions 
of civilian suffering. 
                                                
14 Ramsay, American Media, p. 19. 
15 Astrid Erll, "Remembering across Time, Space, and Cultures: Premediation, Remediation and 
the “Indian Mutiny”," in Mediation, Remediation, and the Dynamics of Cultural Memory, ed. 
Astrid and Rigney Erll, Ann (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), p. 112. 
16 I use the term WWII here more generally, as there are far fewer American war narratives set 
during the Pacific theater than in Europe.  
17 Ramsay, American Media, pp. 163-65. 
18 Ibid., pp. 162-63.  
19 Ibid., pp. 188-190. 
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 Speaking strictly to these American media depictions of the war, Debra Ramsey posits 
the existence of mnemonic structures that act as storehouses of matter—deep structures, in a 
sense—for specific instances of remediation. Though these are constantly in flux, they 
nevertheless demarcate a range for media retellings of the war consistent with the U.S. war 
narrative. Realistic depictions may be remediated into a ludic format precisely because American 
collective memory generally agrees on the meaning of the Pacific War. 
 Conversely, Japan’s collective memory does not lend itself easily to a playable format. 
There are two reasons for this. First, Japanese war narratives have yet to cohere into a single, 
dominant discourse. Second, the actions of a demonized IJA premediate the Japanese player’s 
actions, thus complicating the use of certain forms of violence. 
Speaking to the former, great rifts divide “official” and “sectional narratives,” allowing 
for private and group memories to challenge nationalized ones.20 Thus, while there are 
indubitably mnemonic structures beneath remediation, these are conflicted in nature. Moreover, 
they have become politicized—a point I will speak to in Chapter 3. In understanding how this 
fragmentation can affect cultural production, then, I align myself with Duncan Bell’s assertion 
that memory is “the socially-framed property of individual minds, the neurologically inscribed 
traces of past events,” and that groups conjoined through the memory of shared experience are 
“bounded by both space...and time.”21 In other words, memories as such cannot pass between 
multiple generations over the great geographic distances that make up any nation. Thus, 
memories as they exist within the national consciousness must first be highly narrativized to 
                                                
20 Philip A. Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories: The 'Memory Rifts' in Historical 
Consciousness of World War II (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 14. 
21 Duncan Bell, "Mythscapes: Memory, Mythology, and National Identity," British Journal of 
Sociology 54, no. 1 (2003), p. 72. 
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reflect certain values, at which point they become stories with great enough influence to be 
categorized as “myths.” Myths exist in abundance within a national imaginary, and come into 
conflict over issues such as collective identity.22 Bell terms this space the “mythscape,” a 
theoretical site of dynamic interaction and conflict between dissimilar historical accounts. 
 I argue that war memory, as it pertains to pseudo-historical games, is ultimately a matter 
of myth. As we shall see, games are at odds to historically depict the war precisely because they 
are bound by the key principles of these myths. In other words, while war memory may not 
provide the content of games, it nevertheless shapes cultural production through the frameworks 
of attendant myths. Unlike the United States’ “good war,” no single hegemonic war myth lends 
itself easily to overt representation in Japan. While the (in)famous “victimhood narrative” does 
seem commonplace, Philip A. Seaton argues otherwise: 
Victim consciousness is like the earth’s crust. It is the superficial level of Japanese war 
memories that is most visible, and with which both Japanese and non-Japanese ordinarily 
have most contact. It covers over the memory rifts and for much of the time preserves an 
appearance of calm and national unity in Japanese remembering. But the real forces that 
shape the landscape of Japanese memories are deeper down... The superficial crust of 
victim consciousness offers no protection against the upheavals caused when the friction 
between powerful oppositional forces below the surface (the ‘ideological tectonic plates’) 
becomes too great. 23 
 
Nevertheless, Seaton also notes that the victimhood narrative is useful to cultural production 
precisely because it is the lowest common denominator. Moreover, as Harootunian argues, “it 
would be hard...to find a national experience that has dwelled so long and longingly on the 
postwar [as Japan].”24 In this, he suggests the presence of what Igarashi Yoshikuni has called the 
                                                
22 Duncan Bell, "Introduction: Memory, Trauma and World Politics," in Memory, Trauma and 
World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present, ed. Duncan Bell (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 2. 
23 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, p. 25. 
24 Harootunian, "Japan's Long Postwar,” p. 99. 
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“foundational narrative.” This mechanism allowed for the U.S.-Japan alliance at the war’s end, 
marking the severance with modern history that moved Japan into the Long Postwar. It worked, 
however, by casting Emperor Hirohito as an uninvolved innocent, rather than the head of the 
military. Holding Hirohito “responsible only for his attempt to bring peace to Japan,” the civilian 
populace became victims of the IJA—the military force that hijacked the rightful government.25 
Through transferring their guilt for the war onto the IJA, civilians could forget their own 
involvement and support for imperialism. The total effect of this, then, was to divorce the 
civilian experience of the war from the military. 
The Improbability of Japanese Simulation War Games 
 While the “foundational narrative” is not uncontested, it nevertheless figures prominently 
into Japan’s Long Postwar. Moreover, its core tenets broadly premediate cultural production in 
general. Thus, it is within the logical constraints of this structure that interactive simulations of 
militarism become highly problematic in the Japanese context. Filmic representations of the war 
have themselves had to navigate the fraught waters of war memory, often by portraying civilian 
narratives of the conflict. Videogames cannot follow this example for two reasons. 
First and foremost, videogames require player input to progress. However, playing a 
game that requires acts of violence as a member of the Japanese military—with the attendant 
implication of fun—has the power to deeply undercut the logic of the foundational narrative. To 
create a simulation of the Pacific War would oppose the Japanese player-subjectivity with 
American or Asian military forces. Obviously, the former is problematic due to the post-war 
                                                
25 Yoshikuni Igarashi, "The Bomb, Hirohito, and History: The Foundational Narrative of United 
States-Japan Postwar Relations," Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 6, no. 2 (1998), p. 271. 
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U.S.-Japan alliance, a strategic bond that has broad popular support.26 The U.S. does not 
constitute a monolithic and defunct political institution akin to the Third Reich that can be easily 
demonized, and militaristic violence against American soldiers is therefore untenable. 
Conversely, to attack other Asians raises memories of Japanese colonialism that have been at 
least partially repressed: “[o]utside this picture [the foundational narrative] are the people who 
were mobilized to serve the colonial ‘motherland’.”27 A videogame simulating the killing or 
subjugation of Asian peoples would either raise the specter of civilian collusion in colonialism 
within the body-subject, or face widespread censure insofar as “anything between 50 and 80 per 
cent [of the population]...are either critical of the government’s ‘inadequate’ treatment of war 
responsibility issues...or are supportive of additional compensation and initiatives acknowledging 
aggression.”28 Neither of these roads is copacetic to mainstream cultural production. The act of 
playing furthermore calls into question the mass denouncement of the empire’s acts on the 
continent. If killing is portrayed as fun, then games open an ideological bridge between the 
player-subjectivity and the callous acts of the IJA. This, in turn, problematizes the demonization 
of the old military. It is little wonder, then, that game companies would avoid this potential form 
of historical association. 
Second, videogames cannot feature civilian protagonists if they wish to find potential 
audiences. Playing as a civilian during the Tokyo firebombing, for instance, holds little intrinsic 
                                                
26 While ultra-nationalists might take some pleasure in killing simulated Americans, centrists and 
progressives would certainly not. For more on Japan-U.S. relations, see Yoshio Sugimoto, 
"Nation and Nationalism in Contemporary Japan," in The Sage Handbook of Nations and 
Nationalism, ed. Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (London: SAGE, 2006)., and Paul Midford, 
"Japan-United States Relations," in The Sage Handbook of Modern Japanese Studies, ed. James 
Babb (London: SAGE, 2015). 
27 Sonia Ryang, Japan and National Anthropology: A Critique (New York: Routledge Curzon, 
2004), p. 67. 
28 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, p .23. 
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appeal. Furthermore, portraying this experience as pleasure is incompatible with the collective 
memory of civilian trauma. In short, this form of simulation sits badly with both the victimhood 
and foundational narratives. 
 In sum, the nature of ludic media and the structure of Japanese war memory decreases the 
probability of war simulations. The possibility, of course, remains. Yet only by taking an overt 
political stance as ultranationalist can a game simulate the war itself. Such a work runs up 
against what Seaton terms the “profitability threshold,” or the notion that a cultural product 
targeted at groups other than the representative central political positions risks losing mass 
market appeal.29 The better a game clings to the foundational narrative, then, the broader its 
audience, and the greater its potential profit. 
The Ludic Strategy: Fictional Displacement 
However, videogames nevertheless do bask in violence and encourage Japanese players 
to engage in fictional fights for the purposes of entertainment. Memories of the IJA premediate 
such actions, and therefore necessitate some mechanism for allowing play as fun without 
implicating war memory. The question, then, is what strategies the medium has evolved to cope.  
Let us once again return to the three-part structure of videogames: storyworld, diegetic 
frame, and gameplay. In a hypothetical simulation of war, the storyworld is a historical one, and 
the diegetic context for the player’s actions drawn from reality. Militarism would dictate the 
storyworld, the diegetic frame for the player avatar’s actions, and the content of gameplay: set in 
the Pacific War, the player-subjectivity would step into the shoes of an avatar linked to notions 
of soldiery. Militaristic play, then, would take as its targets Allied troops and other Asians 
through the eyes of the IJA. Conversely, the player could step into the shoes of an Allied 
                                                
29 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, p. 30. 
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soldier—and potentially be forced to fight Japanese fighters.30 No particular configuration of this 
will be entirely uncontentious: the conflict itself overrules every part of the game. 
 Should the storyworld become ahistorical or fantastic, however, the issues inherent in 
simulation fade. This move severs overt links to realistic or historical soldiery, and transforms 
militarism to a theme or a leitmotif. I argue that games seek to divorce militarism from the 
storyworld through this mechanism, which I term fictional displacement. If the storyworld itself 
is made fictional or fantastical, then the player-subjectivity need not be confined to the role of an 
IJA member. In this way, fictional displacement decouples the player-subjectivity’s violent 
actions from continuity with the IJA, shielding the foundational narrative. I believe this is the 
factor that has contoured the overall development of the pseudo-historical genre, if not the 
Japanese videogame industry at large.31 It should come as no surprise, then, that even pseudo-
historical games are marked by depictions of supernatural abilities or forces. This form of 
fictional displacement in the genre is accompanied by a temporal shift into the past or future as 
well. With a setting based in the Sengoku period, these pseudo-historical games can use the 
unification of Japan as a platform for potential violence; in settings of the historically-determined 
future, actions are simply predicted figments. While this usage of the past is perhaps riskier than 
pure fantasy, it is also more in line with the modes of retroactive wondering identified in the 
Introduction. In this way, then, pseudo-history works as a platform par excellence for ludic 
                                                
30 Interestingly, mainstream American war simulations have been localized and sold in Japan. At 
present, it is unclear how Japanese players have responded to games set in the Pacific Theater. 
This is one particularly intriguing avenue for future research. 
31 There are numerous other Japanese game genres wherein fictional displacement is visible. The 
Japanese role-playing game (JRPG), perhaps the most representative of Japan’s offerings, tend 
towards being entirely fantastical. Further research is necessary to create typologies of how this 
genre uses fantasy. Fictional displacement is even evident in more realistic games. The Ace 
Combat series (1992-2015), for example, is a relatively realistic fighter pilot simulation game 
that occurs within a fictional world very loosely based upon the real one. 
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action given the prevailing currents of the late 90s and early 2000s. 
Ludic Violence and Political Pacifism 
 Even under fictional displacement—which is, after all, a function of the storyworld—
violent games must yet take into account pacifism. As a political and national principle, pacifism 
has arisen from the aforementioned discourses of war memory. Indeed, “Japanese pacifisms...are 
closely linked to Japanese victim mentalities and ultimately return to issues of judgmental 
memory,” that is, the ethical evaluation of the war’s outbreak and individual soldier’s actions 
during the conflict.32 Though the longer history need not deter us unduly here, pacifism comes 
from the (in)famous Article IX and the so-called “peace constitution which forever renounces the 
use or threat of use of force to settle international disputes.”33 A great deal of scholarship has 
dealt with Japan’s “one country pacifism” that “was so overwhelming that nearly all the nation's 
energy and resources were mobilized exclusively for economic reconstruction and expansion.”34 
However, as Japan’s power and prestige grew on the world stage in the 1980s, these policies 
were replaced by ones that called for a more “actively engaged Japanese pacifism.”35 Even 
though “neo-conservatives found a way to dislodge pacifist nationalism,” this political clique’s 
goal was ultimately “to make Japan a world leader that could contribute to world peace as an 
equal partner.”36 In other words, pacifism remained as a national tenet; debates rage over how 
best to practice it actively or passively as a global power. There are conservative elements who 
                                                
32 Seaton, Japan’s Contested War Memories, p. 16, 162. 
33 Masaru Tamamoto, "Ambiguous Japan: Japanese National Identity at Century's End," in 
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael 
Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 195. 
34 Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order," Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (1991), p. 61. 
35 Ibid., p. 65. 
36 Shunichi Takekawa, "Forging Nationalism from Pacifism and Internationalism: A Study of 
"Asahi" and "Yomiuri's" New Year's Day Editorials, 1953-2005," Social Science Japan Journal 
10, no. 1 (2007), p. 77. 
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see a need for remilitarization to defend Japan, or as a means of maintaining peace more 
proactively. Conversely, there are progressives who have opposed and continue to oppose the 
Self-Defense Force (SDF), Japan’s current (semi-)military force.37 Indeed, even political calls to 
“normalize” the Japanese military stem from a mixture of active pacifism and desires to fix 
something perceived as abnormal about Japan’s image as a member of the international 
community.38 Simultaneously, however, the progressive left maintains pacifism as a moral 
principle. Thus, pacifism as a national principle is not hegemonic in terms of views on its 
practice. 
It is clear, then, that pacifism(s) and war memory have a close relationship. How, then, 
are we to understand ludic violence against this socio-cultural backdrop? Naturally, violence as a 
general trope is hardly absent from post-war Japanese media; however, the cultural meanings 
associated with certain types of aggressive action are doubtless generated through dialogue with 
war memory, which premediates certain representations. We must, in other words, find a 
framework for understanding the cultural work that ludic violence may perform. In so doing, I 
hope to problematize the notion that “violence is a cultural idiom that requires no translation 
within increasingly transnational entertainment markets.”39 Rather, violence as a cultural idiom 
depends upon the ideologies of a given culture to have meaning. 
 
 
                                                
37 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 192-194. 
38 Sabine Frühstück, Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese 
Army (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), p. 184. 
39 Stephen Kline, Nick Dyer-Witheford, and Greig De Peuter, Digital Play: The Interaction of 
Technology, Culture, and Marketing (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), p. 251. 
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Towards a Typology of Violence in Gameplay 
As noted, violent videogames are hardly a foreign phenomenon in Japan.40 Indeed, 
Shibuya Akiko and Sakamoto Akira found in 2005 that 35 of the 41 games Japanese middle-
school children labeled as their favorites contained violence of some kind.41 However, there is 
very little scholarship on the cultural meanings associated with such violence at the time of 
writing. In part, this is due to the general trends within the field. Following the Columbine High 
School massacre in 1999—the perpetrators of which owned numerous violent videogames—
American socio-psychological scholars have heatedly debated whether aggressive ludic acts lead 
to aggressive actions in real life.42 This has spawned at the global level a “vast but inconclusive 
literature on the effects of violent representations on [sic] television and other media.”43 
While these questions are interesting in their own right, I believe they miss the crucial 
point. How violence affects people seems to me more a function of the various meaningful 
structures surrounding the violence. Consequently, I propose a three-tiered framework. I believe 
that first, we need to analyze the content of violent representation through its distinct 
manifestation in gameplay. Second, we must examine how this violence is framed by the 
diegesis: how does the story explain the need for violence? Does the narrative legitimize 
aggression, or demonize it? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the cultural context 
that encodes certain values into these other two areas. This model allows us to understand the 
                                                
40 As to why games do not simply avoid violence altogether, I can merely conjecture that it has 
something to do with a convergence of global media standards. 
41 Akiko Shibuya and Akira Sakamoto, "The Quantity and Context of Video Game Violence in 
Japan: Toward Creating an Ethical Standard," in Gaming, Simulations, and Society: Research 
Scope and Perspective, ed. Rei Shiratori, K. Arai, and F. Kato (Tokyo: Springer, 2005), p. 113. 
42 For an excellent summation of the four main branches of this debate, see Cynthia Carter, 
Violence and the Media, ed. C. Kay Weaver (Philadelphia, Pa.: Open University Press, 2003), 
pp. 6-15. 
43 Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and De Peuter, Digital Play, p. 247. 
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theoretical effects of violent play as they pertain to greater cultural ideologies, rather than simply 
psychologizing the player. 
Table 1: Ludic Violence 
 
 Speaking to the individual content of violent acts, Shibuya and Sakamoto’s work on 
Japan is illuminating. Although they are fundamentally concerned with the aforementioned 
socio-psychological debate on videogame violence, their content analysis of the medium 
provides a useful system for categorizing content. Of concern to us here is what reasons games 
give for their own violence, which the authors broadly divide between “justified” or 
“unjustified.” In the former category, there are four potential patterns that read as justified 
violent acts when: 1) it is retaliatory or previously provoked; 2) it serves as “protection of 
others/society;” 3) it is committed in self-defense; and 4) it is necessary to continue the game. 
Conversely, a violent act is unjustified when: 1) it is committed against a blameless victim; 2) it 
allows for “personal gain” irrespective of any moral facet; 3) it is an unwarranted emotional 
response such as rage or terror; and 4) the player consciously chooses to continue the game with 
it, despite other options for progression.44 
Crucially, justified violence in the Japanese case is almost exclusively a function of 
defense. Conversely, aggressive acts are seen as unjustified.45 Naturally, the relative merits of a 
                                                
44 Shibuya and Sakamoto, "The Quantity and Context of Video Game Violence in Japan," p. 112, 
115. 
45 Intriguingly, Shibuya and Sakamoto also find that unjustified violence decreased aggression in 
their respondents. 
Cultural Context Ritual/Symbolic Ritual/Symbolic 
Diegetic frame Aggressive (Unjustified) Defensive (Justified) 
Content of Violence - Unprovoked 
- For personal gain 
- Inappropriate emotional response 
- Unnecessary to continue 
- Retaliatory 
- For protection of others 
- Self-defense 
(appropriate response) 
- Necessary to continue 
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violent act are contextually-defined. The diegetic frame ascribes either defensive or aggressive 
overtones to the player-subjectivity’s actions within the game text. Thus, the diegetic frame for 
violence necessarily precedes the content of violence. This point has any possible number of 
interpretations, but I would argue that it hints at the shadow that the IJA still casts over pacifism. 
In any case, aggression is demonized and defense tolerated, if not lauded. 
This point brings us to the cultural context, or what role certain types of violent 
representation play within a given culture. I turn here to Henry A. Giroux’s discussion of 
American filmic violence. Speaking to the “culture of violence” within the United States, Giroux 
argues that there are essentially three types of violence within media, two of which are relevant 
for this discussion.46 The first is “ritualistic:” “utterly banal, predictable, and often 
stereotypically masculine.”47 It does not encourage critical thought on the content or reason for 
violence; rather, it simply reinforces the status quo. In this, ritual violence draws upon a 
nostalgic, Caucasian imaginary that reinforces racial stereotypes through tropes of victimhood or 
perpetration. Giroux’s second type of violence is “symbolic,” which “attempts to connect the 
visceral and reflective.”48 If ritualistic violence seeks to obviate any trace of the ideologies that 
drive it, symbolic violence instead shines a spotlight upon these deeper structures. In other 
words, its goal is not unthinking pleasure, but rather unearthing more significant insights on “the 
complex contradictions that shape human agency, the limits of rationality, and the existential 
issues that tie us to other human beings and a broader social world.”49 
                                                
46 Giroux’s third category is “hyper-real” violence, which disassociates itself with the actuality 
behind actual violence through an extreme adherence to a realistic aesthetic. 
47 Henry A. Giroux, "Pulp Fiction and the Culture of Violence," Harvard Educational Review 
65, no. 2 (1995), p. 301. 
48 Ibid., p. 303. 
49 Ibid.. 
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 While this model can be applied to any game, Japanese or otherwise, I believe that we 
can develop it further for the pseudo-historical genre of games. After all, shifting the setting 
away from strictly historical representation as such does not stop more or less overt intertextual 
referencing of militarism—for even playing as a soldier subjugating others in a fantasy 
storyworld surely sits badly with the foundational narrative. 
 This draws us back to diegetic framing. I argue that violence in pseudo-historical games, 
even under fictional displacement, is construed as militaristic when it broadly fits Shibuya and 
Sakamoto’s categories of unjustified violence. In this regard, aggressive violence alludes to 
Japan’s past expansionism. In the narrative, it may be interlinked with themes of imperialism, 
colonialism, or conquest. Militaristic violence also occurs in homosocial settings, thus 
referencing the male IJA. It is unlikely in the extreme, then, that pseudo-historical games would 
frame the actions of the player through militaristic violence. 
 However, there is no reason why the player avatar cannot oppose militaristic violence. 
Indeed, this definition allows for male antagonists who, by means of being (semi-)surrogates for 
the IJA, reaffirm the reactive pacifism of the Japanese body-subject. More importantly, such an 
antagonist’s violence becomes ritualistic insofar as it reinforces the negative image of the IJA 
and upholds the foundational narrative. In other words, aggressive violence underscores the 
status quo, and (somewhat problematically) re-inscribes the peaceful image of the civilian upon 
the player. 
 This, in turn, allows us to broadly define the player avatar as the antithesis of militaristic 
violence. Broadly speaking, we might expect these protagonists to use violence reactively; that 
is, defensively and in response to some challenge to loved ones or society. While this, too, is a 
function of the diegetic frame, it directly influences the meaning of gameplay. Thus, we come 
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full circle. Through fictional displacement, the storyworld becomes fantastically and temporally 
acceptable as a platform for violence. Through diegetic framing, the player is positioned in such 
a way as to defeat caricatures of militarism, thereby rendering the violence of the gameplay itself 
defensive. 
Yet, there is an inherent contradiction with using violence against violence, justified or 
otherwise. Defensive acts may be less problematic thanks to the broad discourse that has come to 
surround pacifism since the 90s, but they were and are not unambiguously good, either. Simply 
put, the body-subject still must somehow come to terms with violence as such. I will show in the 
next chapter how games use certain constructions of gender to conceal this point, but these do 
not ameliorate the inherent ambiguity. 
In fact, this gap between pacifism and defensive acts contains the potential to change the 
cultural context of violence. If we take post-war Japanese pacifism as the status quo, defensive 
acts have the potential to take on symbolic meaning that questions the very structure and 
necessity of this pacifism—mimicking the aforementioned debate over proactive or reactive 
policy. This symbolic function is borne out via ludic phronesis: games provide the player-
subjectivity the opportunity to reflect upon their violent actions, and the act of play itself 
becomes a window into considerations of pacifism. Put another way, the body-subject may come 
to see defensive violence as an appropriate response to certain situations through the actions of 
the player-subjectivity. As we shall see in Chapter 3, this contains a powerful transformative 
potential. 
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Cultural Context Ritual Symbolic (?) 
Player-subjectivity 
and Body-subject Ludic Phronesis 
Diegetic frame Aggressive (Unjustified) Defensive (Justified) 
Antagonist Protagonist 
Content of 
Violence 
- Unprovoked 
- For personal gain 
- Inappropriate emotional response 
- Player chose to be aggressive 
- Retaliatory 
- For protection of others 
- Self-defense 
(appropriate response) 
- Necessary to continue 
Table 2: Japanese Ludic Violence 
 
Needless to say, developers do not always consciously explore this possibility. From the 
point of view of the profitability threshold, it makes more sense to maintain the status quo. All 
three of the games I analyze seek to overlook the symbolic potential, instead opting to reassert 
denunciations of violence in one way or another through diegetic framing. In this regard, they 
attempt to downplay their transformative potential. However, these efforts are of mixed quality 
and efficacy. In fact, they are necessarily incomplete within the social context of shifting 
pacifisms. Intentional or not, symbolic violence does ultimately have an influence on the 
meanings of a pseudo-historical game text through ludic phronesis—and it is here that games 
take on their transformative potential as cultural technologies. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that games must be read within specific ideo-historical 
contexts in order to understand their meaning because societal discourses structure ludic 
phronesis. In other words, a game’s meaning for players will hinge upon the experiences of the 
player-subjectivity as understood by the body-subject, which itself is the product of greater 
ideologies. Moreover, the socio-political background of Japanese action games complicates 
simulations of WWII—a common genre in the American gaming industry. This is largely due to 
the composition of Japanese war memory that privileges the civilian experience through 
 37 
demonizing the IJA. A game featuring a Japanese soldier as the player avatar ultimately raises 
problematic memories and lowers salability. 
Consequently, games have turned to fictional displacement to allow for violence, and to 
divorce the player-subjectivity’s experience from traces of militarism. Nonetheless, pseudo-
historical games must also account for intertextual references connecting the player’s actions to 
militaristic violence. Instead, these works juxtapose the player avatar with manifestations of 
aggression; that is, antagonists who act to subjugate others within homosocial settings. In this 
instance, militaristic violence is ritual, reinforcing widely-held perceptions of the IJA and 
reflexively aligning the body-subject with reactive pacifism. Thus, the pseudo-historical genre 
permits protagonists to use violence in defensive contexts, thereby justifying these acts. Yet, 
there is an inherent ambiguity in pairing the player with violence of any kind. It is here that 
defensive violence may take on a symbolic quality, questioning the structure of post-war 
pacifism. 
 While we have seen it here in terms of violence, a similar ambiguity manifests itself 
within gender construction and political positions in pseudo-historical games—the topics of 
Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. Individual works have any number of means for suppressing their 
transformative potential, but none can fully extinguish it. This is doubtless a function of the 
background against which both ludic media and the body-subject arise: the retrospective 
wondering of the 90s and 2000s. Ultimately, the experiences of the player-subjectivity provide 
an opportunity to rethink certain topics.
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Chapter 2: Militarism and Masculinity in the Sengoku Period 
 In framing the actions of the player avatar and diegetic violence, few vehicles are more 
powerful than gender. This is perhaps due to gendered nature of various genres. We have already 
seen that otome games target female players. The mainstream pseudo-historical games that I 
analyze, conversely, are made with a male audience in mind. The diegetic framing of masculinity 
is all the more powerful of a tool for it. 
This particular point is not unique to Japan. Giroux himself notes that ritualistic violence 
underscores hegemonic forms of racialized masculinity. Accordingly, studies of American games 
have noted the existence of a “militarized masculinity” within games that “interweaves 
ingredients that range from shooting and fighting skills to magical spells of destruction, strategic 
and tactical war games, espionage, and scenarios of exploration and progress.”1 In other words, 
the acts of the player avatar are diegetically framed in such a way as to have a ritualistic 
masculinizing effect upon the body-subject. As Nola Alloway and Pam Gilbert note, “[t]hrough 
participation in the practices associated with video gaming, boys and young men enter a 
discursive field within which constructions of hegemonic masculinity dominate.”2 While this 
may often take the more defensive form of “killing enemies and saving (largely inconsequential) 
females in a macho display,” there is little to prevent the inclusion of offensive violence.3 Put 
simply, violence makes the man as “ritualistic representations of violence naturalize the 
narratives that simultaneously reflect, create, and maintain reality.”4 In the American cultural 
                                                
1 Kline, Dyer-Witheford, and De Peuter, Digital Play, p. 254. 
2 Nola Alloway and Pam Gilbert, "Video Game Culture: Playing with Masculinity, Violence, and 
Pleasure," in Wired-Up: Young People and the Electronic Media, ed. Sue Howard (Bristol, Pa., 
USA: UCL Press, 1998), p. 93. 
3 Ewan Kirkland, "Masculinity in Video Games: The Gendered Gameplay of Silent Hill," 
Camera Obscura, no. 71 (2009), p. 166. 
4 Alloway and Gilbert, "Video Game Culture," p. 97. 
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context, then, masculinity ties together both aggressive and defensive violence.  
In Japan, however, “the modern connection between proving oneself as a man and 
proving this manhood by success in organized killing...seems obsolete.”5 This chapter, therefore, 
explores how two pseudo-historical games attempt to overcome or conceal the ambiguity 
inherent in violence with a view of masculinity that is itself ambiguous. In a narrative gesture 
reminiscent of 1990s war film, player violence is justified through these manipulations of 
gender, which use post-war tenets of masculinity—expressed as a moral imperative to protect—
in order to relieve the avatar of culpability. Ambiguity presents in these masculinities in two 
ways. First, these constructions share some degree of continuity with wartime rhetoric, making 
them unsafe from the perspective of the foundational narrative. Second, as mentioned above, 
defensive violence does not necessarily sit well with post-war pacifism(s). I look to Onimusha 
and Sengoku BASARA, two games set during the Sengoku era (1467-1603) in Japanese history, to 
demonstrate both the successes and failures of these various strategies. Where the former 
displays as an uneasiness with defensive violence, the latter parodically disrupts the link between 
men and violence through defensive female characters, even while it dabbles with aggressive-
seeming acts. Both remain more safely in the realm of cultural artifacts, however, as they attempt 
to foreclose the possibility of stable masculinities in the mode they propose. 
Gender and Violence in Japanese Media 
Although normative salaryman (sararii man) masculinity in the post-war period does, as 
noted above, disrupt the link between violence and maleness, pseudo-historical games can follow 
the precedent of 1990s Pacific War films. These movies generally sought to “refashion the armed 
                                                
5 Sabine Frühstück, "After Heroism: Must Real Soldiers Die?," in Recreating Japanese Men, ed. 
Sabine Frühstück and Anne Walthall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), p. 92. 
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forces into one [sic] that Japanese could become proud of.”6 This involved attempts to exonerate 
individual members of the war dead by depicting soldiers as victims of the military government, 
changing them from warmongers into suffering civilians. Crucially, these films “adopt the norms 
and moral boundaries of the global Anglo-American popular culture,” where “[c]ourage, 
principle, skills, loyalty, and dedication comprise the backbone of positive moral identity for 
Hollywood models.”7 Sacrifice for, and devotion to, the emperor or nation—examples of actual 
wartime rhetoric—are largely absent. This dovetails neatly with the post-war normative 
masculinity of the salaryman. Though certain dynamics of this “male-ness”—devotion to the 
company, economic progress as a form of national growth, and so on—need not deter us here, 
Hashimoto’s discussion of cinema relates to the trope of men supporting their families. This role 
is often described as daikokubashira. Literally the central pillar of traditional houses, the 
metaphor refers to the husband and father as the central support of the entire family.8 The 
association also marks an unspoken division of labor, where “men are...househeads and 
providers [who require] the support of women as ‘good wives, wise mothers.”9 
In cinema, soldiers are redeemed precisely through their devotion to their families. Films 
imbricate not only the cosmopolitan values of American media, but also localize these notions 
through normative Japanese masculinity.10 I raise this point here to argue that the diegetic frame 
                                                
6 Akiko Hashimoto, The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 76. 
7 Ibid., p. 77. 
8 For more on the salaryman, see Ezra F. Vogel, Japan's New Middle Class, 3rd ed. (Lanham 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013/1963). 
9 James E. Roberson and Nobue Suzuki, "Introduction," in Men and Masculinities in 
Contemporary Japan: Dislocating the Salaryman Doxa, ed. James E. Roberson and Nobue 
Suzuki (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 8. 
10 This is not to a-historically claim that American and Japanese norms are mutually exclusive or 
distinct entities, but rather to note that there are local meanings associated with global tropes of 
masculinity. 
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for the avatar in pseudo-historical games broadly conforms to the form of masculinity found in 
1990s war films. If we take play to be a performative act constrained and shaped by the diegetic 
frame, then the trope of protecting the family as a male avatar creates a logical reason for non-
militaristic violence. In other words, this construction of masculinity establishes a moral 
imperative as a man to defend others. Moreover, it gives the player-subjectivity a motivation 
irrespective of expansionist imperialism—a point underscored if the player avatar is juxtaposed 
to some paragon of militarism. In theory, this form of masculinity does not invoke memories of 
the IJA in the acts of the body-subject. In terms of avoiding militarism, the samurai is a figure 
par excellence for use in ludic media. Though the aesthetics of bushidō were used to justify 
Japanese historical expansionism, at present the samurai has become something of a floating 
signifier.11 Recasting this “symbol of Japanese masculinity and national identity....[and a] 
powerful, if wholly overdetermined icon[,]” in terms of daikokubashira allows a protective male 
figure to subvert or oppose themes of militarism.12 Pseudo-historical games, then, interweave 
elements from the pre-modern cultural imaginary with a form of post- or late-modern 
masculinity in a way that abridges certain memories of the IJA. 
However, as with defensive violence, there is a certain degree of ambiguity within this 
composition. Although “[t]he wartime generation had a generally weaker emotional attachment 
to family life compared to now,” the connection between fighting and the family was present 
nonetheless.13 Dying for the nation was not entirely divorced from familialism—not to mention 
the overriding presence of the nation-as-family metaphor in the rhetoric of the Greater East Asia 
                                                
11 Michele M. Mason, "Empowering the Would-Be Warrior: Bushidō and the Gendered Bodies 
of the Japanese Nation," in Recreating Japanese Men, ed. Sabine Frühstück and Anne Walthall 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), pp. 71-76. 
12 Ibid., p. 87. 
13 Hashimoto, The Long Defeat, p. 74. 
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Co-Prosperity Sphere. Thus, masculinity within games that defines itself through protective 
violence does not constitute a clean break from past discourses of militarism. As such, the 
specific constructions of masculinity in these games are imperfect, and open to forms of gender 
play. Furthermore, even defensive violence does not necessarily sit well with post-war 
conceptions of pacifist nationhood.14 Games may strive to align the player avatar with civilians, 
but the player-subjectivity’s acts are themselves violent. Many games leave the distance between 
these two points untouched, but the gap exists nonetheless. 
In the remainder of this paper, I examine two games that each approach this ambiguity in 
different ways. Onimusha is uncomfortable with defensive violence. Sengoku BASARA, on the 
other hand, questions the pairing of men and violence altogether. 
Onimusha: Plot and Game Structure 
 Onimusha was the joint-creation of director Takeuchi Jun and producer Inafune Keiji. 
Both men were Capcom veterans when they created the game, having gained valuable 
experience on the survival-horror franchise Baio Hazādo (1996-present).15 While Baio Hazādo is 
not a pseudo-historical game, insofar as it deals almost exclusively with scientifically-created 
zombies, elements of its genre do seep into Onimusha, most notably in the grotesque design of 
the player’s enemies. 
Onimusha’s plot revolves around Akechi Samanosuke, the player avatar, and his battles 
against the genma, a fictional species of demon. The game opens with the battle of Okehazama 
in 1560, where the forces of Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) defeated the armies of the Imagawa 
                                                
14 For more on the same as it pertains to the Self-Defense Force (SDF), see Sabine Frühstück, 
Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory, and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2007). 
15 For reasons related to intellectual copyright, this series is known as Resident Evil in North 
American and European markets. 
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Yoshimoto (1519-1560).16 In Onimusha, however, Oda dies in this battle, and is resurrected by 
the genma. One year later, these demons kidnap Princess Yuki, Samanosuke’s cousin, at 
Inabayama Castle. Alongside Kaede, a kunoichi (female ninja), Samanosuke rushes to Yuki’s 
defense, only to be defeated by a large demon. While unconscious, he communes with twelve 
oni—Japanese ogres—who give him a gauntlet with the power to absorb the souls of defeated 
genma. Thus armed, Samanosuke sets out into the castle. He encounters Guildenstern, the genma 
scientist who reanimated Oda, and learns that Yuki is intended as a blood sacrifice to give the 
warlord strength enough to destroy the Saitō clan. Samanosuke then finds Yumemaru, a peasant 
boy whom Yuki adopted, only to see the orphan taken by the genma. The demons intend to kill 
Yumemaru before Yuki, and so drive her into a despair that will make her blood all the more 
powerful. 
 Samanosuke ventures into the world of the genma, where he confronts their king, 
Fortinbras. Defeating the snake-like demon, the samurai frees Yuki and Yumemaru, and all flee 
the degrading hall. However, Fortinbras revives sufficiently to grab Samanosuke, who suddenly 
transforms into a mystical onimusha (oni warrior) and kills the king once and for all. As 
Samanosuke transforms back into a human, he sees Oda in front of him, ending the game on an 
ambiguous note. 
This story, for the most part, comes in the form of cutscenes (kernels), or short films with 
which the player cannot interact. These cutscenes also contextualize play by highlighting player 
goals. In this sense, interactivity is quite prescribed, as the player must complete each goal in 
order to unlock the next kernel. Within the satellites, the gameplay in Onimusha is composed of 
                                                
16 Jeroen Pieter Lamers, Japonius Tyrannus: The Japanese Warlord Oda Nobunaga 
Reconsidered (Leiden: Hotei Publishing, 2000), p. 29. 
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two basic functions: attacking and defending. Each has two options. When attacking, the player 
may use a conventional or a magical assault. The latter are specific to the four otherworldly 
weapons found throughout the game, and deal more damage but use up a magic gauge in the 
process, and cannot be used ad infinitum. The player may also block enemy onslaughts, or dodge 
them. Given the relative strength of the enemies, as well as encounters that pit Samanosuke 
against numerous foes simultaneously, the player must use both offensive and defensive 
techniques. Indeed, charging in heedlessly will all too often result in a game over. Enemies 
almost never go down with a single attack. Rather, it takes at least three hits to vanquish even 
lower level foes. There is one exception to this, an attack that will result in the instant death of 
almost all enemies. However, in this case, the player must wait for the enemy to attack, dodge, 
and then counterstrike. Operationally speaking, this requires split-second timing. However, to 
accomplish so difficult a move yields greater rewards and, arguably, greater pleasure. 
From the perspective of procedural rhetoric, this feature demonstrates the game’s 
ambivalence towards offensive violence: gameplay asks the player-subjectivity not only to 
defend, but to avoid striking first as well. Moreover, the game also shows the consequences of 
the player’s actions through displays of blood when Samanosuke hits an enemy. If we find this 
ambivalence within gameplay itself, we must then question how the diegetic frame 
contextualizes violence. 
Masculinity beyond Militarism, beyond Violence 
 The fictional displacement in Onimusha occurs in the opening scene.17 By killing Oda at 
Okehazama, the battle that arguably started his rise to prominence, the game demarcates its 
                                                
17 Unless otherwise notated, the following quotations are from Jun Takeuchi, "Onimusha," 
(Tokyo: Capcom, 2001). Passage translations are my own. 
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storyworld as fantasy. In this moment, the game divorces itself from any actual historical 
concerns. 
Oda—who never speaks—is also constructed as a paragon of militarism, and thus the 
game’s antagonist. This point merits remark, insofar as there is a tendency to paint the warlord in 
unflattering ways throughout pseudo-historical games set during the sengoku era. Although 
Onimusha is perhaps the most overt, numerous other series also have very ambivalent portrayals 
of Oda.18 In part, this is doubtless due to his actual conduct: in historical and popular discourse, 
he is often seen as a “‘cruel and callous brute,’” an impression his actual martial prowess and 
attacks on religious groups do little to ease.19 Of equal importance is that he was a military leader 
who achieved many of his goals through violence, as opposed to Toyotomi Hideyoshi (c. 1536-
1598) and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616), both of whom were more partial to diplomacy. Oda’s 
character in media is therefore easily premediated by wartime leaders. In other words, it is a 
relatively simple matter to draw ties between militarism and the warlord. 
In Onimusha, this occurs through his portrayal as ambitious to the point of murder, and in 
terms of his masculinity. Oda is only ever seen surrounded by samurai—that is, in militaristic 
homosocial situations—or alone. He is divided from any hint of family, and willing to ignore all 
manner of social mores in order to achieve his goals. He is a caricature of the soldier from a post-
war perspective: aggressive in ambition, violent in method, and uncaring in terms of the family. 
Note that his and the genma’s plan entails not only the destruction of a female body, but also the 
bond between sister and brother. He is the opposite of daikokubashira masculinity, cast in 
militaristic terms—and so ritually cements his position as an emblem of the IJA. 
                                                
18 Most notably, both the Sengoku Musō (2004-present) and Sengoku BASARA (2005-present) 
exhibit this tendency. 
19 Lamers, Japonius Tyrannus, p. 11. 
 46 
By contrast, Samanosuke is a samurai and daikokubashira both. While he is seen fighting 
in the opening scene, he is also portrayed racing back to Inabayama Castle to save Yuki. The 
letter that brought him there displays after the cinematics, and is read aloud in the princess’s 
voice. This construes the player avatar’s actions as a “save-the-princess” narrative—a diegetic 
frame that justifies fighting. In other words, the violence is from its inception defensive and 
retaliatory. Onimusha is also not a romantic narrative. The game never clarifies the nature of 
Samanosuke and Kaede’s relationship, nor if the samurai’s bond with Yuki is more than strictly 
familial. Yumemaru’s inclusion renders the foursome into something akin to a family unit, and 
Samanosuke into an older brother.20 This role is evident in a scene halfway through the game 
where the protagonist, the boy, and Kaede are together. Samanosuke delivers a speech to calm 
Yumemaru whilst giving him a hug. The samurai condemns Sengoku Japan as a place where “the 
strong act as they please.”21 He speaks of his own travels abroad, and bids Yumemaru do 
likewise insofar as “[there] lies freedom, [there] lies hope.” 22 He ends by again deriding the 
internal struggles between fiefdoms, saying that one day such infighting will seem little more 
than dull. Here, daikokubashira is imbricated with post-war pacifism. The speech casts 
Samanosuke’s conflict with Oda in ideological terms: tyranny of the strong versus freedom for 
all. As representative of the latter, the player avatar steps into the heroic role as a protector of 
women and children and a fighter against oppression and despotism. Thus, the plot gives 
Samanosuke and the player-subjectivity morally sound reasons to fight. 
However, Samanosuke is not a father figure per se. That there is so great a sense of 
ambivalence in the family unit bespeaks as much. It is the genma, on Oda’s behest, who wrench 
                                                
20 “Onīchan!” 
21 “Ima no yo wa tsuyoi mono dake ga nosabariyagatte.” 
22 “Jiyū ga aru [,]kibō ga aru.” 
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the four apart; it is Samanosuke who then brings them back together in the game’s ending. Yet 
their reunion is fleeting, as Samanosuke is left behind by the fleeing Kaede, Yuki, and 
Yumemaru. Alone, the samurai transforms into a powerful creature, the onimusha, but in that 
moment becomes a being much like Oda: warlike and otherworldly. The final scene, when the 
two stare at one another over Fortinbras’ corpse, implies a certain parity in this vein. Thus, while 
the civilians flee, Samanosuke is left behind as an embodiment of violence, and, perhaps, 
militarism. The game’s epilogue underscores this division between civilian and fighter. Where 
Yuki and Yumemaru escape the oppressive confines of Japan, Kaede searches in vain for 
Samanosuke and eventually dies in a battle fourteen years later. The samurai’s fate is left 
unknown, though a short scene after the credits implies that he has survived. This turn, which 
sees the civilians with happy endings and the warriors with ambiguous ones, echoes the last 
scene of Kurosawa’s Seven Samurai: “We’ve lost yet again. With their land, the farmers are the 
victors...not us.”23 
This similarity is far from coincidental, as “[d]isturbed by the fanatical militarism present 
in Japan during World War II...Kurosawa aimed to reshape Japanese society for ideals of 
individual autonomy.”24 Onimusha follows the director’s example through imagining peace as 
the realm of civilians—the (non-combatant) women and children, but not of grown martial men. 
In this regard, the game compartmentalizes violent play within the world of the samurai, while 
ascribing normalcy and, indeed, pacifism itself, to civilian sites outside of the game. Indeed, the 
player-subjectivity’s experience occurs exclusively in abnormal spaces, relegating defensive 
violence to the realm of aberration. I would argue that this imagining of peace and conflict that 
                                                
23 Akira Kurosawa, "The Seven Samurai," (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970). 
24 Rie Karatsu, "Between Comedy and Kitsch: Kitano’s Zatoichi and Kurosawa’s Traditions of 
‘Jidaigeki’ comedies," Scope: An Online Journal of Film and TV Studies 6 (2006), p. 5. 
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so strictly divides the civilian from the bellicose further underscores the denunciation of the 
game’s ending. In other words, the game circumvents the symbolic potential of Samanosuke’s 
actions by placing it within violent settings. This insulates everyday spaces from justified 
violence, and firmly closes any doors that the symbolic violence may have opened.   
In the end, Onimusha is uncomfortable with its own use of violence. Even while it 
demonizes Oda and give numerous protective reasons for Samanosuke to fight, it delivers a 
general critique of violence in its dénouement. The narrative positions the player avatar in such a 
way that allows for violent play, but quietly denounces the same in the conclusion. Though the 
game consciously separates representations of militarism from violence through masculinity in 
its diegetic frame, the narrative ultimately conflates the two. In the end, the game seems to decry 
violence as a trait of masculinity, instead putting forth the notion that education and 
cosmopolitanism—as embodied in Yumemaru—are the answers for the future. 
Sengoku BASARA: Plot and Game Structure 
 Whereas Onimusha is studied in its treatment of militarism, masculinity and violence, 
Sengoku BASARA instead traffics in excess. Interestingly, the game’s production team also 
shares in the Baio Hazādo lineage: while there is little public information on director Yamamoto 
Makoto, Kobayashi Hiroyuki, the producer, was also involved in developing the horror game. 
Yet, BASARA’s design similarities with both Baio Hazādo and Onimusha end there. BASARA 
does not feature a central narrative, but rather a series of numerous battle stages that the player 
moves through as one of sixteen possible avatars.25 Each seeks to unify the country.26 All 
characters have brief cutscenes introducing and concluding their storylines, but the actual order 
                                                
25 Unless otherwise notated, the following quotations are from Makoto Yamamoto, and Akitoshi 
Yokoyama, "Sengoku Basara," (Tokyo: Capcom, 2005). Passage translations are my own. 
26 “Tenka tōitsu.” 
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of the battles and opponents is largely left to the player. There is no single correct way to unify 
Japan. 
 Thus, the greater part of the game is satellites. Gameplay consists of fighting through 
waves of enemies. In addition to a basic attack, the player also has a supernatural ability that 
slows time for other characters, and renders the player avatar virtually invincible. The number of 
felled foes is displayed in the lower corner of the screen under the heading “people cut down,” 
and it is common to kill at least one hundred non-player characters (NPCs) during a single 
stage.27 The vast majority are commonplace soldiers, who are significantly less powerful than the 
player avatar. They put up very little fight, and have relatively little health. They are also almost 
entirely identical in appearance, regardless of their faction. Both the Takeda and Oda cavalry 
troops have the same bodily proportions and facial features, and differ only the color of their 
clothing. Furthermore, none of the particular classes are named, nor do they bleed when attacked. 
NPCs are thus positioned as an unindividuated, semi-human mass. 
The game’s website extolls the “feeling of exhilaration that comes with defeating 
hundreds—even thousands—of enemies on your own.”28 As is evident here, BASARA is 
unreservedly a power fantasy, a point that is borne out through the game’s procedural rhetoric. 
The player’s martial prowess becomes the criterion for evaluation: felling as many enemies as 
possible is the only way to raise the level of any given player avatar. Troublingly, lower level 
enemies whose commander has been defeated will cower in fear of the player avatar. Killing 
these downed foes will increase the player’s final score. When compared with Onimusha, then, 
BASARA seems almost disturbingly at ease with associating its storyworld with violence—and 
                                                
27 “Hito kiri.” 
28 "Sengoku Basara: Basaragi," CAPCOM CO., LTD, http://www.capcom.co.jp/sengoku/. 
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semi-aggressive violence at that. 
An Excess of Violence and Non-normative Gender 
 The keys to understanding this difference lies with excess to the point of parody—
something hinted at in the game’s title. First, the game follows Onimusha insofar as it divides 
spaces of peace from those of war. The player-subjectivity is never given the opportunity to 
attack actual innocents; rather, play only occurs on fields of battle. When civilians are implicated 
in the brief narrative sections, they are depicted as victims whose lives are thrown into disarray 
because of the samurai. Peace exists as a possibility beyond the game itself—something hinted at 
in the future. Second, the principle of fictional displacement is soundly at work within BASARA. 
Though the aforementioned website does draw attention to the historical component, in actuality 
the game delves so deeply into fantasy that this claim rings untrue. This can be seen in its basic 
structure. While it is possible to bring Japan under Tokugawa rule, Ieyasu himself is not a 
playable character. Similarly, it is possible to fully unify the country with Oda—something that 
the warlord perished too soon to actually accomplish. Lesser warlords, such as Takeda Shingen 
(1521-1573) or Date Masamune (1567-1636), can also be crowned leaders of Japan, as can 
completely fictional characters such as Itsuki, a twelve-year old girl from the north who wields 
an enormous hammer. These alternate histories pose interesting questions—would Japan have 
been different with a female ruler?—that the game studiously avoids. Rather, completing one 
character’s timeline simply resets the game to point zero, before unification. 
Furthermore, the game is anachronistic in its diegetic frame. Honda Tadakatsu (1548-
1610), one of Tokugawa’s finest generals, wears a robotic suit of armor. Nō-hime, Oda’s wife, 
wields a pair of revolvers, and takes to the battlefield in a low-cut dress. Zabī, a foreign monk 
and the progenitor of his own religion, fights with two cannon strapped to his arms whilst 
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spouting nonsense about “love.” Though these are the more eccentric characters, the point is 
clear: within the confines of the game, literally anyone can unify Japan. It is almost bitingly 
parodic, mocking conceptions of history as sacred and, more importantly, the sanctity of the 
samurai. The storyworld is highly-contained, consciously a-historical, and fantastical. It does not 
ask the body-subject to reflect on their actions by underscoring its own game-ness. Just as there 
are few consequences to victory, so too are there few associated with violence. By means of its 
excesses, then, BASARA does not see much need to comment on violence, defensive or 
otherwise. 
That being said, the game does shy away from militaristic violence. First, the targets of 
aggression are always soldiers and Japanese, with the exception of the comical Zabī. In this 
sense, the setting in the sengoku period neatly sidesteps later ideas of expansionism by delimiting 
the subjugation to the main islands of Japan.29 This goal is partially justified as the pursuit of 
unification, and, presumably, the relative peace of the Edo period. Moreover, the game begins in 
media res, speaking little about the origins of the myriad historical rivalries it features. In this 
sense, history as a setting blurs who is acting aggressively, and who defensively. Finally, as we 
will see, the game de-masculinizes the spaces of conflict by means of including female 
characters. In other words, war is rendered self-consciously heterosocial. In these ways, then, 
BASARA blurs the boundaries of aggressive and defensive violence through a mixture of wild 
visual extravagance and carefully avoiding militaristic violence. 
  Additionally, there is a certain degree of ambiguity surrounding Oda’s character. Indeed, 
masculinity of Samanosuke’s kind can be found in BASARA’s depiction of the warlord. After he 
is selected as the player avatar, the scenes depicting Oda show him with his wife, and his 
                                                
29 Notably, neither Okinawa nor Hokkaido are included in the game map. 
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attendant Mori Ranmaru (1565-1582), here portrayed as a young boy. Once again, we see a form 
of family surrounding the samurai. Unlike his representation in Onimusha, Oda appears here as a 
father figure. As emblematic of daikokubashira masculinity, these visual and narrative conceits 
soften the warlord, thus partially divorcing him from the theme of militarism. In turn, this move 
allows Oda to become a playable avatar. 
Yet the game puts a fair amount of distance between the player and Oda. In BASARA’s 
opening cutscene, for example, a number of characters race towards a castle which is suddenly 
rent apart by a giant Oda with glowing red eyes and wreathed in flame. Similarly, upon picking 
him as a player avatar, the warlord appears seated on a throne behind a row of human skulls. His 
appearance, too, is almost demonic. His helmet has a faceplate with two jagged horns extending 
from either side, and his red mantle flutters behind him like wings. In the final cutscene, Oda 
proclaims his desire to extend his rule from Japan to the rest of the world. These lines are 
accompanied by images of him menacingly hovering in the atmosphere above earth. The 
representations sustain his historical image of brutality and ambition. They also underscore the 
essential difference between Samanosuke and Oda: the former uses violence to defend others, 
while the latter uses it for subjugation. A pseudo-family may take the warlord out of a 
homosocial, militaristic setting in BASARA, but his goals and ambitions persist. In this way, the 
game renders Oda an object of criticism, and, ultimately, demonizes him. In this depiction, then, 
we find much of the same ambivalence as in Onimusha. Oda is playable, but not likeable—an 
iconic figure of militaristic masculinity that cannot, ultimately, be a relatable hero. 
In keeping with themes of parody, however, BASARA moves one step further. Even while 
it problematizes the link between militarism and masculinity through Oda, it also questions 
whether protective violence is the sole purview of men. It suggests that women, too, might turn 
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to such means should the need arise. Itsuki is the prime example of this. The girl enters the fray 
because she has a vision of her village’s crop of rice burning on account of the war. A shining 
line beams down, and an ethereal voice—presumably a goddess—informs Itsuki that she will be 
given a great power in order to stop the war. She is awoken from her dream when a giant 
hammer comes flying down from the sky. With this weapon in hand, she comes to lead the 
peasant revolts. However, Itsuki’s turn to violence is meant to bring about peace from its outset, 
unlike the samurai whose motivations include lust for power and various grudges. As it is 
provoked by the samurai, her choice to take up violence is reactive, rather than aggressive. That 
her weapon references the uchide-no-kozuchi, a legendary hammer that has certain wish-granting 
properties, bears witness to the generative element of her violence, rather than the destructive. 
Itsuki’s end goals are pacifist. This point is particularly evident in her conclusion, where she runs 
through the same rice paddies, and, realizing she no longer has need of it, tosses her weapon into 
the air. Quite literally, Itsuki throws away violence once her purpose has been achieved. Her 
actions, then, are both defensive in that they protect her village, and justifiable in that they lead 
to peace. In this way, Itsuki is the ideal player avatar. Through her gender, she has few ties to 
historical militarism thematically; through her aims, she marries defensive violence with peace. 
By destabilizing the tie between masculinity and protective violence, BASARA’s female 
characters, like Itsuki, cement the option of defensive violence for femininities. 
It would a mistake, however, to see this as a particularly nuanced or feminist text. While 
on the one hand, these defensive femininities do raise questions of gender, the constructs 
themselves seem to play a parodic part. Put another way, their inclusion highlights the game’s 
ridiculousness, rather than the frailty of masculinity. Moreover, each of the female characters is 
clearly conceived of with a male audience in mind, be it in terms of revealing clothing or camera 
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angles that clearly objectify their figures. Each also has a protective agenda. Itsuki’s works to 
save her village, whereas Nō-hime and Matsu—Maeda Toshii’s wife—take to the battlefield to 
keep their respective husbands safe. Kasuga, a female ninja romantically attached to Uesugi 
Kenshin, likewise acts as a protector. While these women do represent a break from 
masculinized violence, they are simultaneously the targets of another form of gender 
stereotyping that sees women resorting to violence only in extreme situations. Whereas the game 
sees men aggressively advancing their own agendas, be it a search for power or revenge, women 
can only resort to defensive violence when their loved ones or homes are threatened. In a sense, 
gender here acts as a softening feature, much as Oda’s family does: women are paired with 
tropes of defensive violence to downplay intertextual references to militarism. While this is 
novel in certain regards, it also broadly fits into our understanding of pseudo-historical games as 
gendered products. 
In sum, BASARA moves far into fantastical territory in its excess and fictional 
displacement, ultimately emphasizing its own game-ness and lack of consequences as it basks in 
general violence. On the one hand, it conforms to the selfsame ambivalence found in Onimusha’s 
treatment of Samanosuke. On the other hand, however, it imagines a link between femininity, 
protective violence, and civilians through Itsuki. This undermines fighting as a male 
phenomenon, thus severing links with themes of militarism in history. However, while the game 
plays with gender stereotypes for these purposes, it does not actually subvert them. Rather, it 
parodies constructions of gender based upon defensive violence, and so undercuts the stability of 
protective masculinities. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that the conditions of war memory and pacifistic 
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nationhood have led to a phenomenon in pseudo-historical videogames that pairs masculinity 
with protection. Against male antagonists, who use aggressive violence—ritually cementing their 
status as emblems of the IJA—protagonists instead use defensive violence through an unstable 
relationship with tropes of protection. The masculinity of these avatars serves as a platform for 
the logical opposition of militarism. Nonetheless, as we have seen with Onimusha, this 
construction is tenuous. Although the game’s defensive violence has symbolic potential, its 
narrative works to compartmentalize violence within abnormal spaces, and quietly denounces all 
violence in its dénouement. Sengoku BASARA, on the other hand, uses a mixture of excess and 
gender play to disassociate potentially aggressive violence from militarism. In a way, it decenters 
men from the military and the tropes of samurai; in another way, it introduces new, problematic 
constructions of femininity to the mix. Ultimately, both games broadly conform to our model of 
videogame violence, but through drastically different strategies. 
 In closing, I wish to note that Onimusha and Sengoku BASARA are in dialogue with 
greater societal questions related to violence and pacifism. Masculinity, militarism, and nation 
are deeply interlinked within the foundational narrative: Hirohito, as a representative of the 
Japanese nation, became the “docile female who unconditionally accept[ed] the United States’ 
desire for self-assurance.”30 Where the pre-war period saw masculinity articulated through 
nationalistic militarism, the post-war period instead looked to pacifism and economic 
development. In this period, violence became metaphoric—the purview of embattled companies 
and salarymen—and largely disconnected from masculinity. On the one hand, this conventional 
take on normative masculinity remains in both games. Onimusha sings quiet praise for pacifist 
masculinity, and BASARA’s excess offers a parodic take on the violence of the samurai. While 
                                                
30 Igarashi, “The Bomb, Hirohito and History,” p. 273. 
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both games depict tropes of daikokubashira as working in tandem with violence, neither quite 
naturalizes the violent acts of male protectors. In this sense, both games bear the mark of pacifist 
nationhood. 
 Onimusha and BASARA are very much cultural artifacts, reflecting the specific 
ambiguities of the so-called lost decade. While the questions they pose hint at greater societal 
changes—the potential shape of post-post war Japan—both consciously shy away from any 
definitive answers. They underscore the status quo in slightly different manners, and maintain a 
state of wondering in so doing.
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Chapter 3: The Historico-Political Landscape of Metal Gear Solid 
 If games may comment upon gender constructions, then ludic phronesis also invites the 
player-subjectivity to participate in various political discourses.1 This capacity is doubly 
remarkable in Japan’s case, where the political spectrum is divided less by social issues (as in the 
United States) than by the clashing of historical myths surrounding World War II and the 
associated issue of rearmament.2 As we have seen, games can be unintentionally transformative 
due to symbolic violence. How, then, do they relate to the politicized myths of war memory? In 
answering this question, I devote this chapter to evaluating Metal Gear Solid. Kojima Hideo, the 
game’s producer and director, worked on no less than five other major Konami IPs before 
starting the project that would win him international acclaim. In spite of the game and Kojima’s 
stature within player communities, Metal Gear itself has caught the attention of Japanese and 
Euro-American academics only for its pedagogical value, and as a design benchmark for industry 
insiders.3 The political implications of the plot, where America’s military-industrial complex 
pursues global hegemony through advanced nuclear weaponry, have thus far gone untouched. 
 As a story, Metal Gear draws upon three conflicting Japanese historico-political myths, 
in Bell’s sense: the moral pacifism of the progressives, the forgetfulness of the center, and the 
selective memory of the nationalists. I argue that this patchwork does not seek to intentionally 
intertwine disparate threads of political thought, but rather reflects the deeply fragmented 
                                                
1 Ian Bogost, Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2007). 
2 Shogo Suzuki, "The Rise of the Chinese ‘ Other’ in Japan's Construction of Identity: Is China a 
Focal Point of Japanese Nationalism?," The Pacific Review 28, no. 1 (2015), p. 99. 
3 See, for example, Jim Bizzocchi, "The Role of Narrative in Educational Games and 
Simulations," in Educational Gameplay and Simulation Environments (Hershey: IGI Global, 
2010) and David Freeman, "Creating Emotion in Games: The Craft and Art of Emotioneering," 
Computers in Entertainment (CIE) 2, no. 3 (2004). 
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landscape of Japanese war memory. As a game, Metal Gear wavers between progressive and 
nationalistic sensibilities. In places, it encourages non-violent gameplay; in others, it coerces the 
player-subjectivity into killing fictional enemies. The latter depends upon a moral utilitarianism 
to justify defensive violence, which itself feeds into nationalistic discourse. Through this, the 
game ultimately undercuts the logic of the very political position it seeks to defend—and in so 
doing, acts as a closed circuit drawing together the very ends of the political spectrum. 
Interstices of Politics and Past: War Memory 
 A game like Metal Gear derives its transformative potential because it is a “technology of 
memory...through which memories are shared, produced, and given meaning.”4 This is crucial 
precisely because of the intimate relationship between war memory and political positions. 
While I have used centrist conceptions of the war in my analysis thus far, I now examine the 
fringes as well—for if we are to understand how a technology of memory acts upon the political 
subjectivity of the player, we must first examine what disparate historical discourses surround 
the body-subject.  
 As mentioned above, memories of WWII remain deeply divided. Nonetheless, Japan’s 
mythscape contains three basic myths, each of which is attached to a political position. 
“Judgmental war memory”—the ethical evaluation of the war’s outbreak and individual soldier’s 
actions—creates difference among these three points.5 These are: 1) Japan’s relationship with the 
U.S.; 2) the ethicality of the war; and 3) memories of the wartime IJA. 
 Underlying all is the aforementioned “foundational narrative.” This amputation of 
militarism from the Japanese nationhood(s) necessarily repressed memories of soldiers and the 
                                                
4 Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the Aids Epidemic, and the Politics of 
Remembering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 9. 
5 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, p. 16. 
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war dead, who were sealed behind the bomb that “has come to metonymically represent all 
memories of the war.”6 The nationalization of the nuclear attack narrative further led to “the 
perception that ordinary Japanese people had been the passive victims of historical conditions.”7 
This sense of victimhood allowed the U.S. to take on a role as “a benevolent American 
power...[that] rescues Japan from the brink of its own self-destruction.”8 From this arose the 
most representative political viewpoint in Japan today: the “progressive-leaning group.”9 This 
occupies a central position in Japan’s political spectrum.10 It continues to support alliance with 
Washington D.C., and is broadly pro-U.S.11 On the other hand, “progressives,” whose lineage 
lies with pre- and post-war leftist and democratic movements, have come to see “the United 
States [as] a particularly dangerous bully that must be kept at great distance, for fear that Japan 
will become entangled in American [military] adventures.”12 In this sense, they reject the 
foundational narrative of U.S. salvation. At the other end of the spectrum, the nationalists share 
in this wariness, but instead worry about America’s symbolic “castration” of Japan.13 They 
vocalize this by attempting to “build an independent, full-spectrum military that could use 
force,” and are less averse to seeking the nuclear deterrent to bolster Japan’s strength as a 
nation.14 Naturally, they are alone in this: progressives and the central progressive-leaning group 
                                                
6 Igarashi, "The Bomb, Hirohito, and History., p. 288. 
7 Lisa Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999), p. 11. 
8 Igarashi, "The Bomb, Hirohito, and History," p. 280. 
9 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, p. 21. 
10 Seaton also speaks of the “conservatives” as another viewpoint hovering around center. 
Similar to the progressive-leaning group in quasi-pacifism and a pro U.S. stance, they believe 
that the war was justifiable given the historical circumstances. However, as this perspective 
represents Japan’s political elite, it falls outside the scope of my analysis. 
11 Samuels, Securing Japan, pp. 111, 124-131. 
12 Ibid., p. 111. 
13 Suzuki, "The Rise of the Chinese ‘Other’," pp. 101-103. 
14 Samuels, Securing Japan, p. 112. 
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abhor atomic weapons. 
 In terms of the ethicality of the war, the progressive-leaning group decries the conflict as 
immoral, and now hold to a (quasi-) moral pacifism. However, they do not necessarily consider 
civilian culpability in doing so. Instead, they allow the mass amnesia of the foundational 
narrative to cover the war period. While the “progressives” also hold closely to pacifism as a 
principle of national security and, indeed, morality, they break from the centrists in how history 
should be remembered.15 The progressives demand that Japan recall the entirety of its 
imperialism, from civilian support to Japan’s aggressive actions against the Asian mainland. 
They find pride in the moral strength to remember such a past. The “nationalists” also seek to 
remember the war but in a very different way. Their view is that Japan’s action on the continent 
was one of liberation, to free Asia from Western colonialism.16 To them, victimhood is 
weakness; the war effort should be lauded, not forgotten. 
 The conduct and associated memories of the IJA are another point of major contention 
among the three groups. The nationalists deploy moral utilitarianism to exonerate the soldiers of 
their crimes. The act of fighting Western imperialism in Asia was just, and therefore every battle 
fought—no matter how bloody or depraved—was justified. The progressive-leaning group 
acknowledges the IJA as war criminals, but more as a scapegoat for their own sense of 
responsibility. Consequently, they either repress memories of the IJA, or remember them in such 
a way as to maneuver “around the core ideological issue of Japanese war responsibility.”17 
Progressives face IJA atrocities throughout the Pacific head on. They use a moral absolutism, 
                                                
15 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, pp. 19-20. 
16 I use the term “West” here to indicate that, although certain European nations did have real 
territorial possessions in Asia, the nationalist rhetoric deals more with a semi-imaginary unity 
that Japan defined itself against. 
17 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, p. 22. 
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which holds that each individual action must be considered by its own ethical merits. 
Consequently, every soldier (and civilian) ought to be judged based on what they did, rather than 
as gears within a larger machine. 
 Media representations of the war also reflect this divide. The notion of resisting Euro-
America domination and “saving” those oppressed by Western imperial powers pervades 
nationalist works. The centrist position, on the other hand, either represses memories of the IJA 
en masse or attempts to redeem individual soldiers through post-war values. This was 
particularly clear during efforts in the films mentioned in Chapter 2, which typically involved 
casting IJA members as victims of the military government, changing them from warmongers 
into suffering civilians. Thus, centrist narratives tend towards the “victim-hero,” a civilian whose 
maltreatment at the hands of the military clique serves to “avoid or marginalize issues of war 
responsibility.”18 Progressive media, conversely, often comes in the form of documentaries 
featuring ex-soldiers in their bid to remember the Pacific War.19 In other words, the progressives 
remember in shame, the center forgets or represses, and the nationalists memorialize with pride. 
 As summarized in the following chart, we can trace three nexuses of politics and memory 
in the discourses surrounding the body-subject of the Japanese player.20 These can be expressed 
in three questions. The first question addresses how the U.S. is viewed. Is it a staunch ally, or a 
threatening bully? The second question deals with how the IJA are portrayed: were these 
righteous heroes, or violent villains? The final question considers the ethicality of the war. Was it 
a rapacious Japanese campaign, unjustifiable by any moral absolutism, or a reasonable conflict—
                                                
18 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, p. 138. 
19 Ibid., p. 146. 
20 I have oversimplified the issues in this chart. However, as the views of these three positions 
are complex and often overlap, the chart serves to clarify the key points of the following 
discussion. 
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by utilitarian standards—to free Asia of Western influence?21 With this in mind, I now turn to 
considering how Metal Gear Solid answers these questions. 
 Progressive Progressive-Leaning Nationalist 
U.S. Bully Ally Bully 
Memories of IJA  Villains Villains Heroes 
Ethicality of the War Unethical 
(moral 
absolutism)  
Unethical Ethical 
(moral utilitarianism) 
Table 3: Historico-political positions 
 
Metal Gear Solid: Plot and Game Structure 
Let us begin with an overview of the game’s plot; that is, the kernels.22 Set in 2005, the 
player steps into the role of Solid Snake, a U.S. operative sent to a nuclear waste disposal facility 
on an island in Alaska. There, his former unit, FOXHOUND—an elite corps of American super-
soldiers—has taken two hostages in a terrorist action: the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) chief and the president of ArmsTech, a fictional defense contractor. 
FOXHOUND cryptically demands the remains of a Cold War era super-soldier named Big Boss 
as their condition for surrendering. Snake’s mission is to infiltrate the island, rescue the DARPA 
and ArmTech heads, and ascertain whether or not FOXHOUND can launch a nuclear strike as 
they threaten. Upon finding the captives, Snake learns that the complex is a facade for a nuclear 
weapons development lab. The DARPA chief and ArmsTech president had come to watch tests 
of a new “Metal Gear”—a walking nuclear tank codenamed REX.23 Both have revealed to 
                                                
21 For more on differences between positions, see Yoshio Sugimoto, "Nation and Nationalism in 
Contemporary Japan," in The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, ed. Gerard Delanty 
and Krishan Kumar (London: SAGE, 2006), and Kevin M. Doak, "What Is a Nation and Who 
Belongs? National Narratives and the Ethnic Imagination in Twentieth," American Historical 
Review 102, no. 2 (1997). 
22 Unless otherwise notated, the following quotations are from Kojima Hideo, "Metal Gear 
Solid," (Tokyo: Konami, 1998). I have taken name spellings from the official localized version, 
while passage translations are my own. 
23 “Kakutōsaihokōsensha.” 
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FOXHOUND the codes necessary for launching an actual attack, leaving Snake to use an 
override key to deactivate REX and prevent nuclear war. Both men then succumb to mysterious 
heart attacks. 
 Under his friend Colonel Roy Campbell’s command and with the help of a support staff, 
Snake manages to sneak past enemy troops. He picks up two allies, and starts to defeat the heads 
of FOXHOUND. However, Snake learns that his superiors have deceived him about his mission: 
the government actually dispatched him as a carrier of the FOXDIE virus to infect the terrorists. 
As a bioweapon that targets specific DNA sequences, it is particularly potent against the 
FOXHOUND leadership and the genetically modified “genome soldiers” who fill out the ranks 
of the unit.24 As these troops are slowly dying due to genetic disintegration, the terrorist 
leadership has demanded Big Boss’s corpse as a means of stabilizing their men’s DNA. 
Putting betrayal aside, Snake overrides the Metal Gear launch program at the climax of 
the story—only to discover he has armed it instead. Liquid Snake, the commander of 
FOXHOUND, has been manipulating him all along. He plans to fire a nuclear warhead at China. 
Given upcoming anti-proliferation talks, he reasons that this will create international conflict. 
Liquid’s goal in this is to start a new Cold War, and thus drive up the need for soldiers. After a 
pitched battle, Snake defeats REX and Liquid, whereupon the latter reveals that both he and 
Snake are clones of Big Boss, and bred to kill. 
 While Snake has effectively neutralized the threat, Secretary of Defense Jim Houseman 
forcibly takes command of the mission from Campbell. Houseman launches nuclear bombers to 
raze the island, thus erasing the wrongdoing on the part of the U.S. The president intervenes at 
the last second, and Snake escapes with one or the other of his allies on the understanding that he 
                                                
24 “Genomu heishi.” 
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is now officially “deceased.” 
 While Metal Gear tells an exceedingly complex tale through its kernels, it is similar to 
much that we have already seen. The principle of fictional displacement is evident in the timing 
of the game: produced in 1998, the story occurs in 2005. Though it is science fiction in one 
sense, it is firmly anchored within the real past—thereby rendering it a pseudo-historical work. 
In fact, the setting initially seems quite realistic: Metal Gear borrows frequently from the actual 
history of the Cold War, and brings in any number of U.S. governmental entities like DARPA 
However, the story becomes increasingly more fantastic as the game continues. This is evident in 
futuristic technologies such as FOXDIE and Metal Gear REX, and in FOXHOUND’s 
superhuman abilities. 
Between these kernels, satellites allow the player to sneak past genome soldiers, moving 
through the facility, and encountering FOXHOUND members. The game does have two possible 
endings, which are almost identical in content and differ only in which of Snake’s allies survives 
the ordeal.  This point notwithstanding, Metal Gear is quite similar to Onimusha. However, the 
former deals far more directly with militarism as a central story theme than the latter. This draws 
us back to the specific diegetic framing. The four main groups of characters—FOXHOUND, 
monolithic military-industrial complex, Snake’s support staff, and Snake’s immediate allies—are 
particularly relevant for this analysis. Broadly speaking, the first two of these groups are villains; 
and the latter, protagonists. These affiliations reveal both the game’s intended and unintended 
readings. 
Narrative: Progressive Reading 
In considering its narrative, I argue that Metal Gear first and foremost espouses a 
progressive message. The game also politicizes this before the ending credits in a screen 
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detailing the actual state of nuclear proliferation in 1998: 
 In the 1980s, over 60,000 nuclear warheads existed in the world at any given time.  
Their total destructive power came to 1 million times that of the Hiroshima A-bomb. 
 In January 1993, America and Russia signed START2 and agreed to reduce their 
 deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 by December 31, 2000. 
 However, as of 1998, 26,000 nuclear warheads still exist in the world.25 
 
 The tone here is accusatory, implying the U.S. has failed to meet its treaty obligations. 
The military-industrial complex within the game likewise serves as a critique of the U.S. Both 
DARPA, which deals in futuristic technologies, and ArmsTech run according to a warped logic: 
their greed for wealth and power have led them to create Metal Gear REX, a truly terrifying 
weapon that can fire nuclear warheads invisible both to radar and missile defense systems. REX 
questions American intentions and bespeaks a latent fear of an international “bully.” 
 Lurking behind this, however, is the specter of the IJA. This is most apparent in how the 
game establishes FOXHOUND as the antagonists. The unit is a self-acknowledged product of 
the Cold War. Their ultimate goal, as Liquid’s diatribe near the game’s end makes clear, is 
“rebuilding an age where warriors (senshi) like us will find use.”26 In the peaceful 21st century, 
they seek to start a second Cold War to drive up the demand for militaries. In this warmongering 
spirit, FOXHOUND invokes a progressive version of the IJA: a military force inciting war for its 
own ends. That the terrorists choose the People’s Republic of China as a target underscores 
FOXHOUND’s ties with the IJA as an aggressor against mainland Asia—and thereby renders 
their violence ritualistic in progressive eyes. 
                                                
25 “1980 nendai, sekai niwa tsūji roku man patsu ijyō no kakuheiki ga sonzai shita. Sono 
hakairyoku wa Hiroshimagatagenbaku no 100 manpatsu bun ni sōtō suru./1993 nen 1 gatsu ni 
START2 ga musubare Amerika-Roshia wa seireki 2000 nen 12 gatsu 31 nichi made ni senryaku 
kakudantō no haibisū  o sorezore 3000~3500 hatsu ni sakugen suru koto ni dōi shita./Shikashi 
1998 nen genzai, sekai ni wa nao ni man roku sen hatsu no kakuheiki ga sonzai shite iru.” 
26“Ore tachi no yō na senshi ga ikasareru toki o futatabi kizukiageru koto.” 
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 The framing of Jim Houseman also speaks volumes in this regard. As Secretary of 
Defense, Houseman acts without the president’s consent, most notably by ordering the island 
destroyed. Here, the game overtly references the IJA hijacking Japan from the rightful civilian 
leadership. In this light, FOXHOUND’s insurrection is premediated by the February 26 Incident 
in 1936, where a cadre of young IJA officers defied their superiors and occupied the Ministry of 
War to restore the emperor. While this group arose from an internal division in the army, it was 
nevertheless a particularly virulent outcome of the military system. Whether or not Metal Gear’s 
creators chose this incident as a point of intertextual reference—and I do not believe they did so 
consciously—this incident necessarily premediates the depiction of FOXHOUND. Indeed, it is 
difficult to overlook the similarities: the terrorist group in the game, too, may be seen as 
symptomatic of a greater systemic ill. As he once belonged to FOXHOUND, Snake may share in 
their militancy. Liquid accuses him of having an appetite for killing (satsuriku)—for why else 
would Snake have continued his mission in spite of numerous betrayals? 
 Yet, Snake confronts FOXHOUND and the military-industrial complex, counterposing 
the player controlling him with the U.S. and the IJA. Insofar as it is a reaction to aggressive 
terrorism, Snake’s mission itself is for the greater good of all humanity. In this sense, player 
violence is defensive and diegetically justified against the virulent threat of perpetual warfare. 
Snake’s personal development also draws him away from the military in general. This journey is 
expressed in character dialogue through the word “purpose” (mokuteki). The term appears 
frequently and with increasingly more profound overtones. At the game’s beginning, it speaks to 
concrete goals: what the terrorists want, and so on. As time goes on, however, it comes to 
connote life purpose. In both endings, Snake and his surviving ally reaffirm the need to find a 
new raison d’être. The protagonist even goes so far as to say, “let’s find a new path, for both of 
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us.”27 Where this will lead is left unclear, but the game obviously implies that a meaningful life 
can be lived only outside of soldiery. Here, Metal Gear takes an overtly pacifist stance: nothing 
good comes of war. This point is underscored by the fact that Snake cannot save both of his 
allies. Insofar as the game paints him in a protective role—and his charges are of differing 
sexes—his masculinity holds to the same principles of defensiveness we have seen elsewhere. In 
spite of this, his proximity to matters military ultimately means that his aegis is imperfect. The 
game problematizes Snake’s role as a protector, suggesting that tragedy awaits those who take to 
soldiery, whatever their reasons.28 
 The game further perpetuates this message in its discussion of genetics as creating 
soldiers over multiple generations. Snake, as a clone of Big Boss, has literally been bred to fight. 
Meryl became a soldier to comprehend her father. Naomi, one member of the heterosocial and 
multi-national support staff, chose a career in science to find a connection with parents she never 
knew. All three characters eventually distance themselves from this thinking. Only Liquid argues 
for genetic determinism: “No one can disobey their genes. That is fate.”29 Naomi’s voiceover at 
the end of the game puts a stop to this: “We cannot be bound by fate, nor ruled by our genetics. 
We must choose our own way to live.”30 
I would argue that the attention paid to genetic determinism amounts to acknowledging 
the past. This acts as a nod to the last great war: we must understand our (grand)fathers’ battles, 
quite literally in Meryl’s case. However, Meryl ultimately rejects soldiery as a fool’s game. 
Remembering the past, then, is a worthy goal, but only provided that it leads to a break with 
                                                
27 “Ore tachi no, atarashii michi o mitsukeyō.” 
28 In this regard, Metal Gear’s plot may parallel The Human Condition by Kobayashi Masaki. 
29 “Dare mo idenshi ni sakarau koto wa dekinai, sore wa unmei da.” 
30 “Unmei ni shibarete wa ikenai. Idenshi ni shihai sarete wa ikenai. Ikikata o erabu no wa 
watashi tachi na no yo.” 
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militarism. Liquid, obsessed with his genes, cannot let go of this belligerent past—and is 
punished for it. In finding purpose outside of militarism, the game promotes a progressive view 
of history that encourages remembering the war to be a better pacifist now. On all three major 
points, then, the narrative conforms to a progressive sensibility: 1) war is portrayed as ethically 
wrong; 2) Snake confronts an aggressive IJA; 3) Snake resists a belligerent U.S that is 
unabashedly developing the tools of war and war capability. In the end, then, the game promotes 
a moral pacifism and criticizes any who do not hold to it. 
 From this reading of the narrative, we can construct the implied player as Japanese, and 
15 years or older.31 For reasons both listed above and to follow, he is also likely male. 
Politically, he may lean slightly towards the progressives, or belongs to Seaton’s “don’t know, 
don’t care” group. Due to the game’s violent material and treatment of military matters, the 
implied player is most likely not progressive.32 This suggests that Metal Gear attempts to 
persuade the player of the progressive’s legitimacy. 
Centrist reading 
 Even while targeting a progressive player at the most overt level of narrative, however, 
Metal Gear also panders to the center. The reasons for this are essentially in line with Seaton’s 
profitability threshold: given that the central group makes up the majority of the political 
spectrum, media products that conform to their historical narrative have the greatest earning 
potential.33 As Metal Gear curbs its progressive message to increase its profitability through a 
certain ambiguity, it invites a reading that ironically contradicts the message it purports, a 
                                                
31 As noted above, the game was given a “C” rating (15+) by the Computer Entertainment Rating 
System (CERO). 
32 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, p. 21. 
33 Ibid., p. 30. 
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reading that hangs on the language associated with the soldier and conceals actual Japanese 
militarism within history. 
 The text constructs military identities in one of three terms that conform to contemporary 
usage in Japan: “soldiers” (gunjin), “warriors” (senshi), or “troops” (heishi). While heishi 
signifies the genome soldiers, the other two terms take on racialized overtones. Related to Anglo-
Americans Campbell and Meryl, gunjin comes to connote unthinking tools of government, and 
excises individuality from the soldier. For instance, Snake chides Campbell when learning that 
the colonel joined the mission because Meryl, his niece, had been taken hostage: “Got a personal 
motive, huh? Not very soldierly of you.”34 As mentioned, Meryl’s choice to become gunjin 
stems from a desire to know the past. Both characters are punished for these personal 
transgressions of their role as gunjin: Campbell proves himself disloyal, while Meryl sustains a 
near fatal wound. She recants, “I was soft, to be attracted to soldiery… On the battlefield, there is 
nothing. Nothing is born of war. For my sake, Snake, survive!”35 While this functions as a 
general renunciation of militarism, it also redeems Meryl from her specific identity as gunjin. 
 Senshi, conversely, indicates subaltern groups. Snake never makes explicit his own ethnic 
background, yet Raven, a member of FOXHOUND, calls him senshi, as does Naomi who claims 
Japanese-American heritage. Raven also indicates that Snake has “Asian blood,” and suggests a 
shared ancestry in Mongolia in a way that heavily implies Snake is partially Japanese.36 In lieu of 
more authoritative sources, this exchange heightens the implied player’s sense of association 
                                                
34 “Kojinteki na kidō ka... Gunjin rashikunai na.” 
35 “Watashi ga amakatta. Gunjin nanka ni akogarete... Senjyō niwa nanimo nai. Sensō dewa 
nanimo umarenai. Watashi no kawari ni ikinuite, Sunēku!” 
36 “Omae, tōyōjin no chi ga nagarete iru na... Naruhodo, omae mo oretachi to onaji monguru kei 
ka. Arasuka-indian wa nihonjin ni chikai, sosen ga onaji da tomo iwarete iru.”  
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with the protagonist, and, ironically, FOXHOUND.37 No named member of this terrorist unit is 
exclusively Euro-American, save Liquid, who is a clone. Of the five who appear in the game, 
Revolver Ocelot is Russian, Psycho Mantis seemingly was an inhabitant of a former USSR 
colony, Vulcan Raven is an Inuit shaman, and Sniper Wolf is Kurdish.38 Senshi are tied together 
through victimhood, all having suffered at American or Soviet hands. Ocelot—the exception to 
this rule—is revealed after the final credits to be a double-agent apparently working for the 
American President.39 The Russian notwithstanding, FOXHOUND thus becomes the ethnic 
“other” who band together to resist the world of gunjin; that is, Anglo-American hegemony. 
Through Snake, Japan succumbs to victimhood at the whim of greater powers, a move that 
reinforces the foundational narrative. The game’s story represses memories of Japanese 
militarism to claim victimhood at American hands. 
 As a term, senshi also forgets the actual history of the IJA as an oppressor while 
simultaneously glorifying Japan’s pre-modern martial values. This reading is enabled by the 
retroactive influence the word senshi exercises on the subalterns, making them pre-modern 
warriors acting in a post-modern world. FOXHOUND members are unique individuals within an 
outdated honor-bound system of combat. By inferring Japanese association with this group, 
Japan’s modern history falls away. Snake becomes a samurai-like figure in the new millennium: 
tragically loyal to a government that no longer has need of human warriors. This point is made 
clear in the character of Gray Fox, a former (and presumed deceased) member of FOXHOUND 
                                                
37 In Metal Gear Solid 4 (2008), Snake’s surrogate mother reveals that his egg donor was 
Japanese (“kenkō na nihonjin jyosei”). 
38 "Metal Gear Solid Game Archives," Konami Digital Entertainment, 
http://www.konami.jp/gs/game/mgs/. 
39 In later games, this point becomes far muddier. In fact, Ocelot worked for a secret agency 
without any particular national allegiances. 
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excruciatingly transformed into a cyborg ninja—complete with samurai sword—by some 
shadowy branch of the American government. As becomes apparent through Gray Fox’s 
infrequent appearances throughout the game, this process has robbed him of his sanity and 
personality. Now, he lives merely to fight and defeat Snake in one-on-one combat. Although he 
ultimately dies to save Snake, Gray Fox represents senshi in the extreme: using a premodern 
weapon and warrior-like values with postmodern technology, he abridges modernity and the 
figure of the gunjin.40 As is implicit here, the possibility of Japanese gunjin vanishes into the idea 
of senshi. This releases some of the pressure behind the game’s entrenched critique of soldiery, 
comfortably relegating Japanese militarism to the pre-modern era instead. Here, then, the game 
overlooks the IJA. It places Japanese militarism as something of the distant past, and does not 
force the player to consider any culpability as a potential descendant of the gunjin. 
 The portrayal of the death of FOXHOUND’s agents—save Ocelot—further paints senshi 
as beings out of time.41 Wolf, for instance, spent a horrific childhood as a Kurd in a war zone, 
turning towards violence as a means of escape. The game uses heart-wrenching music to induce 
an affective response in the player in the case of Mantis’s death as well. This casts FOXHOUND 
as victims, while bemoaning the anachronistic value set of senshi. In this sense, the game raises 
the specter of the IJA, yet fails to specifically indict the Japanese gunjin. Similarly, the game also 
criticizes gunjin when related to Anglo-Americans, but never specifically identifies the heishi as 
                                                
40 In the re-release of the game on a different console, Metal Gear Solid: The Twin Snakes 
(2004), Snake himself takes up this sword in order to defeat REX. 
41 Ocelot is the sole survivor of FOXHOUND, but given his complex allegiances, his inclusion 
within the subaltern category is debatable. On the one hand, he may simply be an American 
agent; on the other, he may be “Eastern” as an ex-Soviet agent. 
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American.42 Metal Gear toes the line by calling the interactive enemies “terrorists,” rather than 
specifying their nationality. Thus, while the narrative remains pacifist in its critique of soldiery, 
it avoids anything too uncomfortable for the implied centrist player: the Japanese gunjin who 
might raise distressing questions, or the deaths of American soldiers that might derail the 
foundational narrative. Metal Gear undercuts its overt message through an adherence to the 
selective forgetfulness, victimhood narrative, and pro-U.S. stance of the progressive-leaning 
group. 
Nationalist reading 
 Nevertheless, any thinking players would be aware that they could kill Americans. This 
draws us to the final reading of the narrative. By means of glorifying a racialized notion of senshi 
death on the battlefield and positioning the U.S. as a hegemonic threat, Metal Gear 
unconsciously taps into nationalist myths and ironically praises the IJA. I assume this inclusion 
to be unintentional; however, I lack the empirical evidence to demonstrate this claim. I also 
acknowledge there is a chance that this ambiguity is intentional and meant to secure the game’s 
profit across the entire political spectrum. Nevertheless, I believe the textual evidence listed 
above, as well as the fact that nationalistic media tend to alienate other parts of the audience, 
suffices as proof of unintentionality for our purposes here. 
 As previously discussed, the nationalists (and conservatives) wish to return honor to the 
fallen as “[t]he whole war cannot be acknowledged as ‘aggressive:’ that would delegitimize the 
nobility of the war generation and render their deaths meaningless.”43 Their agenda is to see the 
                                                
42 This omission is one found in media products associated with the foundational narrative. 
Gojira, for instance, features numerous allusions to the U.S., but not one overt reference. For 
more, see Igarashi Yoshikuni, Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese 
Culture, 1945-1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 114-118. 
43 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, p. 22. 
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war dead exonerated. Snake echoes this struggle in describing defeated soldiers as “dogs,” even 
using the phrase dog’s death (inujini) when talking to Meryl.44 Put more concisely, the 
protagonist makes it clear that gunjin’s deaths are senseless without victory. However, he is far 
more sympathetic to senshi, who may gain honor by dying on the battlefield. As Wolf is dying, 
for example, Snake calls the wolves, which she is so fond of, righteous and noble, and ends by 
saying she deserves her moniker.45 This highly charged language allows senshi who die in battle 
to be remembered as valiant, regardless of the cause. Given the racialized element of senshi, this 
positioning raises the spirit of the IJA in a more sympathetic light. 
 The fact that FOXHOUND’s deaths all occur while resisting U.S. hegemony foregrounds 
this sentiment. The theme of defiance plays well for the nationalists, for whom “[p]ride is based 
in denying culpability, lauding soldiers’ heroism and affirming positive aspects of Japanese 
militarism, in particular...the liberation of Asian nations from Western colonialism.”46 With 
America poised to overrun the subaltern FOXHOUND, this seems dangerously close to the 
rhetoric of the Greater East Asia war; that is, that holy battle must be waged in order to resist the 
Imperial powers. The terrorists’ cause may prove to be a losing one, but the glorification of their 
deaths links repressed memories of dead soldiers to the goal of resisting the West. 
 In sum, the game commiserates with FOXHOUND as Cold War subalterns to remember 
and glorify the Japanese senshi. To these warriors, the game ascribes personal goals that are 
understandable, even relatable. This parallels the aforementioned shift 1990s cinema that “tries 
                                                
44 “Kore wa kunren dewa nai, seishi o kaketa tatakai da. Hiirō mo hiroin mo inai, makereba tada 
no inujini da.”  
45 “Ōkami wa kōketsu na ikimono da, inu to wa chigau. Yūpikkugo dewa ōkami no koto o 
keburuneku to ii, kōki na ikimono toshite agamete iru. Ore tachi no yō na yōhei wa ‘sensō no 
inu’ to yobarete iru. Tashika ni ore tachi wa shōmohin. Shikashi, omae wa chigau, ōkami da, inu 
dewa nai.”  
46 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, p. 22 
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to turn the whole war into one fought to protect loved ones, not to sacrifice for the fatherland or 
the Emperor.”47 Casting FOXHOUND members as sympathetic characters valorizes their 
sacrifice against the U.S., and by proxy that of the Japanese soldier during the war. The unit 
becomes a floating signifier, a critique and an exoneration of the IJA. The game allows for a 
reading so antithetical to its intended message precisely because the narrative straddles 
progressive and centrist positions. The former embeds a deep distrust of the U.S., while the latter 
represses memories of IJA atrocities with a nostalgic view of the (pre-modern) past. From this 
emerges a perspective that unintentionally justifies the Pacific War as one of liberation. In terms 
of Japan’s relationship with the U.S., the ethicality of the war, and the memories of the wartime 
IJA, then, the game ultimately falls within the parameters of nationalist logic. 
Gameplay: Progressive Reading 
              At the narrative level, the presence of the nationalist rhetoric is relatively weak. 
However, nationalist elements are embedded deeply within the procedural logic of the game—
deeply, indeed, in how Metal Gear demands to be played. 
 This is once again an ironic and unwilled addition. Metal Gear, based in Kojima’s design 
philosophy that “fighting alone does not a game make,” fundamentally belongs to the stealth 
genre of games (“Tactical Espionage Action,” as the game’s cover itself puts it).48 As an agent 
alone in hostile territory, the player must infiltrate the facility by crawling, hiding, and waiting as 
necessary. The game penalizes players who disobey this logic: Metal Gear becomes significantly 
harder for those who go in all guns blazing. Snake can be easily killed if discovered by the 
enemy. Depending on where the protagonist dies, the player may also have to replay a given 
                                                
47 Hashimoto, The Long Defeat, p. 74. 
48 "Metal Gear Solid Game Archives," Konami Digital Entertainment, 
http://www.konami.jp/gs/game/mgs/. 
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section—traverse the same terrain, skirt the same enemies, and so on. Both of these points can be 
sources of great annoyance, and encourage silent and careful play. 
  Nevertheless, violence is not disallowed by the game rules. In one sense, this is 
thematically justified in the narrative via the aforementioned defensive themes. Moreover, the 
connection between FOXHOUND and the IJA allows for “punishing” them as warmongering 
criminals. This works in tune with a moral absolutist rationale: the senshi and heishi have acted 
violently, and therefore deserve retribution for their deeds no matter what their reasons may be. 
However, the game resists allowing the player-subjectivity to make this judgment. It is precisely 
because FOXHOUND acts as a surrogate for the IJA that the player ought to be merciful and 
find the moral high ground. The message within this gameplay denounces punishment in the 
form of murder, even against a radical military unit. As “[p]rogressives regard themselves as 
humanitarian leaders of moral conscience,” Metal Gear’s adherence to non-violent gameplay 
gives the player the experience of moral pacifism.49 The game proceduralizes its progressive 
message within the satellites: violence need not be the answer to violent situations. In this regard, 
the non-violent aspects of gameplay may be seen as ritualistic, re-inscribing the progressive 
political position. 
 This logic operates in cutscenes as well. While these will depict Snake harming others, 
the fact that the kernels are non-interactive effectively disengages the player-subjectivity from 
the violence. These videos denaturalize the player’s bond with Snake by eliciting a sense of 
moral abhorrence for this senshi within the body-subject. This, too, heightens the sense of moral 
absolutism. Moreover, in most cases FOXHOUND members succumb to fatal wounds. Snake is 
shown as killing someone himself only once, and this at Wolf’s request. The game is fairly coy 
                                                
49 Seaton, Japan's Contested War Memories, p. 22. 
 76 
in this instance, since the screen fades to white and the player can only hear a gunshot. Even in 
the cutscenes, then, the game avoids dirtying the player-subjectivity’s hands through suspending 
interactivity. 
 Metal Gear even uses one cutscene to censure the violence of the player-subjectivity. 
Though scenes are normally filmed from a third-person perspective, the game switches to a first-
person view when Liquid condemns Snake as a killer. The accusation is thus directed squarely at 
the player, who has killed enemy characters by this point in the game. In spite of allowing for 
such play—even demanding such play—Metal Gear lodges a barbed critique of violence in this 
moment. The game thus reinforces its proceduralized pacifistic message within this kernel: any 
killing, no matter the reason, is wrong. 
Nationalist reading 
 This heavy-handed cutscene notwithstanding, the satellites succumb to the same 
fragmentation as the kernels, as Metal Gear also condones fatal violence under certain 
conditions. Cutscenes of killing may beg player disapproval, but the same cannot be said for the 
violence in one-on-one fights against FOXHOUND members. When combating Vulcan Raven, 
Snake is locked in a space with the marauding villain. Escape is impossible, and hiding is a 
temporary option at best. Violence is justified here for two reasons, both of which shift towards 
moral utilitarianism. First, these fights are for survival, as the player-subjectivity must literally 
kill or be killed, having no other means to progress in the game. Second, in terms of diegetic 
framing, defeating FOXHOUND will prevent nuclear war. In both cases, the ends outweigh the 
evil of killing for the player-subjectivity. Subsequently, the body-subject must grapple with these 
actions under the given circumstances: should self-defense merit the use of lethal force? What 
about stopping a terrorist force? By couching the player-subjectivity’s actions in such terms, 
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Metal Gear allows the body-subject to reconsider a pacifist sensibility. 
 The same holds true for several pre-scripted game sequences. One of these occurs early 
on, when the player-subjectivity must shoot a number of enemies to continue the game. Designed 
as a tutorial for a newly acquired gun, the event’s abruptness comes as a shock. In response, the 
game consciously targets the male body-subject, as the sequence comes shortly after meeting 
Meryl. Three foes burst into the rooms with guns blazing, and she will scream loudly if shot. 
This seeks to stimulate a protective response in the male body-subject. The game coercively uses 
gender roles to overcome the aversion to killing on the part of the player. It further lessens the 
blow by having the heishi’s bodies vanish after they hit the ground, leaving behind no evidence 
of the player-subjectivity’s deeds. 
 Metal Gear ultimately justifies killing through a chivalric frame, asking the body-subject 
to consider killing in defense of the weak. Though the links here with Onimusha are palpable, in 
fact the two games are quite different: whereas the Sengoku-era game relegates overtly gendered 
protective violence to the diegetic framing, Metal Gear actually proceduralizes it. Similarly, 
Onimusha condemns violence in its conclusion, closing the symbolic potential of defense. Metal 
Gear’s narrative, on the other hand, leaves the symbolic potential open, calling for a movement 
forward—that is, beyond militarism. The dénouement will rob Snake of one ally, it leaves the 
other unharmed, and thereby partially endorses his defensive masculinity. In total, these elements 
unintentionally give the body-subject access to a space for reassessing moral pacifism as a male 
player in addition to further questions related to the entrenched nationalist rhetoric. 
 We can see that Metal Gear proceduralizes utilitarian violence in ways that directly 
undercut the progressive message of the stealth gameplay. As an imposed moral regime, it 
portrays non-violence as a luxury: soldiers must kill in self-defense, and in the defense of others. 
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In this light, pacifism and moral absolutism seem overly idealized. This pairs well with the 
romanticized senshi within the narrative. FOXHOUND, though villains, are sympathetically 
portrayed in resisting Western hegemony. By proxy, this also raises the possibility of an IJA to 
which the player may relate. Combined with the utilitarian experiences of the player-subjectivity, 
the game makes an argument for the nationalist view of history across its kernels and satellites: it 
distrusts the U.S., reifies the IJA’s sacrifice and reaffirms the ethicality of the war. 
 Naturally, the body-subject may well reject the nationalist rhetoric. Yet, this message 
connects with weak points in the centrist and progressive positions. As for the matter of moral 
pacifism, “[m]any Japanese began to find this stance unrealistic and irrational” after the end of 
the Cold War.50 The game plays into this concern by justifying violence in defense of self and 
“others.” Furthermore, as the game forces the player-subjectivity to kill, it also problematizes the 
way that the central position scapegoats the IJA: not all soldiers’ actions can be written off 
without considering the circumstances. In toto, Metal Gear suggests that the war was just, and 
that the IJA may not be a monolithic villain. The acts of the player-subjectivity serve as proof of 
the necessity to reconsider nationalist arguments. Subsequently, the body-subject must engage 
with these claims by means of extant historico-political discourses. It is here, then, that the 
potentially transformative power of Metal Gear lives, and also here that the game becomes a 
historico-political technology that may push the player from the center towards nationalism. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that Metal Gear Solid ties together disparate historical 
myths as a technology of memory. As a node interlinking numerous historic discourses, games 
allow the player-subjectivity to test out the legitimacy of others’ claims. Beneath this, again, lies 
                                                
50 Hironori Sasada, "Youth and Nationalism in Japan," SAIS Review 26, no. 2 (2006), p. 117. 
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the symbolic composition of its violence that itself questions moral pacifism. Though the game 
attempts to undo this symbolic potential in part through proceduralizing a progressive message, 
both narrative and gameplay elements undercut this rhetoric. This does not represent the intended 
meaning of the text, but rather reflects a series of designs that unwittingly create a hole within 
the progressive view for nationalist sentiment to fill. Finally, I have suggested that gameplay and 
narrative aspects of the game cast doubt on the trustworthiness of the U.S., the place of the IJA, 
and the ethicality of the war itself. This, in turn, may engender player sympathy for the 
nationalists’ historico-political myth. 
 This is the latent power of the ambiguity at the interstices of war memory, politics, and 
ludic violence: powerful transformative potential. Metal Gear is remarkable in part because it 
deals very directly with themes of militarism in ways that Onimusha and Sengoku BASARA do 
not. However, Metal Gear ends up falling prey to the ambiguity of masculinity and of violence, 
resulting in a product that links two different ends of the political spectrum. As we have seen, it 
is precisely its status as a cultural artifact that allows it to take on this function as a cultural 
technology—suggesting one unexpected path away from retrospective wondering.
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Conclusion 
 In this thesis, I have argued that videogames are cultural artifacts and technologies in that 
they are shaped by, as well as shape, certain ideologies. I have focused particularly on war 
memory, gender constructions, and political identities. I have shown how memories of the 
Imperial Japanese Army render historical simulations of World War II—one of the most 
common genres in the American market—unlikely in Japan’s case, if not impossible. Instead, the 
Japanese game industry has evolved the tactic of fictional displacement, which allows for certain 
types of violence. Even then, however, games must deal with the theme of militarism; that is, the 
intertextual referencing of elements of the IJA that sit badly with the foundational narrative. 
Games in the pseudo-historical genre have come to rely upon caricatures of the IJA as 
antagonists in order to align the Japanese player with civilian narratives of war. In this sense, the 
violence that antagonists use against the player avatar is ritualistic, underscoring the 
demonization of militaristic aggression that is homosocial and references subjugation. The 
players themselves are allowed to use defensive violence—a form that pseudo-historical games 
justify through composing masculinities that use violence in retaliation or to protect others. 
However, there are two layers of ambiguity to this construction. First, tropes of protection 
and familialism were not unknown during the pre-war and wartime periods, tarnishing the 
novelty of protective masculinity in games. Second, defensive violence becomes symbolic within 
the Japanese context insofar as it raises questions about moral pacifism as a practice. I have 
shown how two games set during the sengoku period have each responded differently to these 
ambiguities. Onimusha quietly chastises the player’s actions, even in defensive form, seeking to 
close any doors the symbolic nature of the violence may have opened at the narrative level. 
Sengoku BASARA, conversely, uses its excess and parody to isolate its violent play. 
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Nevertheless, it questions the link between defensive violence and men, ultimately making 
certain strides towards de-gendering violence for parodic purpose. 
I finally explored the transformative potential of Metal Gear Solid, a game that deals 
directly with American militarism and ties together disparate Japanese historical myths. At its 
surface, it espouses a progressive message using the actions of FOXHOUND to ritualistically 
demonize a caricature of the IJA. However, its gameplay and narrative both ultimately undercut 
this rhetoric: through curbing its superficial message to meet the expectations of the centrist 
player, the game unwittingly opens a hole at the narrative level that allows for a degree of 
sympathy with FOXHOUND in racialized terms. Moreover, the game’s dependence upon certain 
types of violence—both in terms of gendered protection and self-defense—allows the symbolic 
potential to not only raise questions concerning moral pacifism, but also to openly suggests that 
it may be overly idealistic in its absolute morality. The game reflects the fragmented landscape 
of war memory; however, in its specific usage of historico-political myths, the game presents an 
unintended nationalist message with the power to affect the player’s political subjectivity. 
 In naming games cultural artifacts, my hope is to demonstrate that their effects are greater 
than that of texts intended for play. Fictional displacement adds an obfuscating layer to these 
proceedings in many ways, but each of the pseudo-historical games I have examined is in 
dialogue both with the logic associated with the myths of war memory, and with greater societal 
changes of the late 1990s. In terms of masculinity, Onimusha and BASARA each contain threads 
of thought that, while perhaps not novel in content, are newer in presentation. The 
(re)combination of defensiveness with masculinity and violence sits well with cries for 
“normalizing” the nation—that is, restoring Japan’s capability for offensive military action. Such 
calls continue to emerge since the collapse of the economic bubble in 1991. As I have 
 82 
mentioned, this selfsame timespan also marked an era of “loss” for salarymen in terms of work 
stability, family, and societal approval.1 It is only against this societal backdrop of change that 
the defensive violence within pseudo-historical videogames takes on its symbolic overtones. 
Even though the narratives of Onimusha and BASARA display ambivalence towards violence, 
their very structure raises questions concerning pacifist nationhood, and whether it is truly the 
best path forward for defense of loved ones. They also ask whether non-violent salarymen can 
provide for their families, challenging hegemonic conceptions of Japanese masculinity 
altogether. In other words, these games reimagine violence in a defensive manner that has 
implications for the public debates over the scope of Japan’s Self-Defense Force. It is not 
difficult, after all, to read the masculinity within these games allegorically: if not for 
Samanosuke, what would have happened to Yuki and Yumemaru? Onimusha’s plot answers this 
question with a moral imperative not so very different from Metal Gear’s moral utilitarianism. 
Whatever negative attitudes these games take towards defensive violence, they nevertheless pose 
piercing questions concerning key social issues—and, through ludic phronesis, we cannot simply 
discount their transformative potential. 
 I should hasten to say that I am not suggesting that any single game has the power to 
dislodge people from their political positions. Given Onimusha and BASARA’s denial of their 
respective lacuna, their effects are likely curtailed as well. Moreover, Metal Gear is an 
exceptional work, being one of the few of its generation to deal so directly with issues of 
militarism. In so doing, it captures the fragmented political and mnemonic landscape quite well. 
That being said, the common thread between all three games remains the ambiguity surrounding 
the role of violence. Ludic violence in any Japanese pseudo-historical game may well be 
                                                
1 Roberson and Suzuki, “Introduction,” pp. 9-10. 
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symbolic, but Metal Gear alone leaves the path open for reinterpretation in its dénouement. What 
the three together suggest is that the entanglement of memory, gender, and politics means that 
the pseudo-historical genre—and perhaps videogames as a medium in general—do have the 
capacity to become cultural technologies in aggregate. The question that this research raises is 
one of reception: how have videogames affected their Japanese players? 
This thesis ultimately has been a pilot study, and I have not conducted the in-depth 
ethnography of the player community to speak to the other half of my overall argument. In 
closing, then, I hope to suggest future directions that this research might take. The first, and most 
obvious, is a detailed analysis of videogame reception in two particular areas. First, how do male 
players’ self-image change through exposure to these works? Any number of scholars have 
written on otaku as a form of counter-hegemonic manhood. Ian Condry has noted that “many 
interpretations of otaku masculinity share a common assumption with salaryman masculinity, 
namely, that value (a man’s worth) tends to be grounded in productivity.”2 However, he takes 
this issue with this axiom, arguing that otaku constitutes a new form of manhood that creates 
value recursively through consumption. In off- and online forums, this can result in “the urge to 
translate immaterial, internalized consumption into something outwardly productive.”3 While 
there is some doubt in my mind that the gamer and otaku subcultures are entirely isomorphic, 
Condry’s broader point about people’s relationship with media is an intriguing one. How does 
the body-subject transform the player-subjectivity’s experiences into (im)material forms of 
productive labor? Moreover, how do female players view this selfsame pairing of manhood and 
protective violence? Akiko Sugawa-Shimada has already noted that Sengoku BASARA is a 
                                                
2 Condry, “Love Revolution,” p. 265. 
3 Ibid., 280. 
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seminal text in the rekijyo phenomenon, where young women have developed an interest in 
actual history via pseudo-historical media.4 More research in this vein is necessary to understand 
how the consumption of gender constructions may transfer into other productive realms. 
Second, we ought to question how consumption of pseudo-historical games affects 
political subjectivity. My study suggests that one outlet of production, in Condry’s sense, may 
well be political conservativism. Any number of scholars have considered nationalist manga and 
anime in the contemporary shift of youth towards nationalism.5 Adding videogames to these 
media will, I believe, provide a clearer picture of the cultural forces influencing political 
subjectivities. This thesis thus indicates that videogames deserve scrutiny in constructivist 
accounts of Japanese politics. In this, examining not only the text, but also the audience, will be 
critical. Naturally, no media exerts a hegemonic influence upon the viewer, who themselves are 
free to agree, disagree, or simply ignore messages. However, I believe that reactions are 
structured by both the text and the cultural background. Political commentary may well function 
as one outlet for otaku and player masculinity. In any case, an ethnographic examination of male 
players would doubtlessly prove illuminating from both political and anthropological 
standpoints. 
A related line of inquiry has to do with the changes in games through time. Needless to 
say, a synchronic examination of the period I have examined would aid in expanding upon and 
refining my basic framework. However, I think a diachronic view of the pseudo-historical genre 
would prove more valuable. I have detected fictional displacement at work in games made 
                                                
4 Akiko Sugawa-Shimada, "Rekijo, Pilgrimage and ‘Pop-Spiritualism’: Pop-Culture-Induced 
Heritage Tourism of/for Young Women" (paper presented at the Japan Forum, 2015). 
5 For example, see Rumi Sakamoto, "Will You Go to War? Or Will You Stop Being Japanese? 
Nationalism and History in Kobayashi Yoshinori’s Sensoron," Japan Focus 23 (2008). 
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between 1998 and 2005, but I cannot say whether this strategy is unique to this period. 
Discovering how and when fictional displacement became widespread would elucidate broader 
changes in war memory, gender, and politics. In a similar vein, I believe that historicizing the 
genre would allow for a more nuanced understanding of its capacity as a technology. As it 
happens, “[s]urveys have shown that support for pacifist policies has declined from 15.5 percent 
in 1972 to 5.6 percent in 2006.”6 Have games from this period preempted the emergence of 
certain types of discourse surrounding, say, the SDF? Or have they evolved contemporaneously, 
in which case games would function to reinforce, rather than to generate, certain ideas? 
Moreover, how have Japanese media in general worked diachronically to reimagine violence, 
and to what degree have these ideas moved transmedially? In this regard, my research raises the 
need for a cultural history of games, both as they have evolved as a medium and how they have 
borrowed from, and broken with, other forms of Japanese media. 
 Finally, I return to issues of hybridity. While a cultural history of games doubtless would 
take into account the Euro-American influences on the Japanese industry, these games have 
global appeal. As such, the intra-regional flows of ludic media offer an excellent opportunity to 
practice “Asia as method.”7 If, as I have argued, concerns of war memory have shaped the 
direction of play, how do we explain the regional popularity of the games? Does this truncation 
of the colonial past allow for unimpeded passage across national boundaries? My preliminary 
research hints that single-player Japanese games in general have not enjoyed great success in 
South Korea. Japanese producers of both hardware and software have not made concerted pushes 
                                                
6 Sasada, "Youth and Nationalism in Japan," p. 117. 
7 For examples, see Koichi Iwabuchi, "Korean Wave and Inter-Asian Referencing," in The 
Korean Wave: Korean Media Go Global, ed. Youna Kim (New York: Routledge, 2013). and 
Biao Xiang, Brenda Yeoh, and Mika Toyota, eds., Return: Nationalizing Transnational Mobility 
in Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013). 
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into the neighboring market, not even after the end of South Korea’s governmental ban on 
Japanese cultural products in 2000. Nonetheless, Korean player communities have grown around 
Japanese ludic media, sometimes illicitly. How these groups perceive such products, too, may 
reveal interesting developments in terms of politico-historical discourses of war and colonialism 
in both nations. This line of inquiry, then, offers a potentially rich vein of information for 
cultural scholars of East Asia. 
 I opened this thesis by speaking to a sense of retrospective wondering prevalent in Japan 
since the 1990s. The videogame industry developed partially against this background, and this 
doubtless leaves a legacy even today. However, the largest question that only time can answer is 
how these games will figure into the shape of post-post war Japan. Ludic media are actively 
engaged in societal processes: culture not only affects games, but games also affect culture 
within a particular historical moment. Hopefully, my research proves a bridge between Game 
Studies and Japanese Studies: for the former to consider the value of ideo-cultural context within 
reading strategies, and the latter to engage in a systematic study of ludic media as they contribute 
to the imagining of the past, the present, and the future.
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